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CHAPTER I
THE PRELUDE
The course of Germany's diplomatic contact with Finland
during the twentieth century has been shaped largely byGerman war a i m s •in the eastern Baltic.

In time of war,.Ger

many. has had' to control the Baltic in order to protect the
vital shipments of iron ore from Sweden and also to prevent
any attack on its northern coast.

Finland commands a highly

strategic position in the northeast corner of the Baltic.

A

strictly neutral Finland presented no real threat to Germany
during a war, but Finland, with its population of only three
and a half million, could hardly hope to remain neutral of
her own choice if it became the subject of either German or
Russian military strategy.
If Germany chose to conquer Finland or direct Its for
eign policy as an ally, it could gain many valuable strategic
advantages.

First of all, Finland could be used as a spring

board for an attack on Russia's northern borders,

Finland's

pre -1939 eastern boundary, beginning at Petsamo in the north
and extending south to the northeast corner of Lake Ladoga,
shared almost a seven-hundred raiie common front with Russia.
Control of the Petsamo area, could be used for an attack on
the sea lanes leading to Murmansk, Russia's northern lifeline;

2
and the border running along Soviet Karelia offered innu-.
merable points from which an attack could be- launched
against the Murmansk-Leningrad Railroad,

Finland’s pre-1939

southern border with Russia crossed the narrow Karelian
Isthmus which separates Lake Ladoga from the Gulf of Finland,
At this point, Finland lay only twenty miles from Leningrad,
placing Russia’s second largest city well within the range
of modern artillery.

The port of Hanko, located on the

southwestern coast, was the Finnish harbor nearest to Germany
and it could be used as a staging area or, a point from which .
the Gulf of Finland could be closed to enemy shipping.: To
the west, of Turku, Finland's ancient capital, lie the -Aaland
Islands.

There islands control the western approach to

Stockholm and also dominate the sea lanes in the Gulf of
Bothnia.

Finland's geographical position easily lent itself

to any German war plans for the domination of the Baltic or ■
the' establishment of a second front against Russia.
Unfortunately for Finland, Russia also recognized the
strategic importance of its northern neighbor, and in the
continuing course of the mutual animosity between Germany
and Russia, nearly all of Finland’s diplomatic history in
this century must be viewed as a struggle to avoid being
turned into a Russo-German battlefield.

No other nations or

groups of nations came even-close to approximating the
importance that Germany and Russia played in Finland’s inter
nal and external policies.

So important were Germany and

3
Russia to Finnish foreign affairs that Wipert von Bluecher,
the German Ambassador to Finland from 1939 to 199-9, was led
to observe that " ... all her ^Finland.'_s/ other diplomatic
activities are carried on more or less as a sideshow*"i
Finland has long been caught between the eastern expan™
sion of the Western European nations and the western movement
of Russia*

First under Swedish control from the twelfth

century and then as a Russian Grand Duchy under the tsars
from 1809, Finland's position in the Baltic caused it to be
used as a buffer zone of first one nation and then another,
Germany began to exert its influence on the fate of
Finland's political destiny from the beginning of World War I.
Since the German involvement in Finland during the last year of World War I closely parallelled the events that led to
the Finno-German collaboration of 199-1, it is important to
have a knowledge of the circumstances that surrounded Fin
land's fight for independence and the German military
intervention that kept the Bolshevik Revolution from absorbing
the newly formed state*
During World War I, the German Eastern offensive sapped
Russia's strength, and as Russia weakened her control over
Finland weakened proportionately,

1

Germany helped Finland

U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign
Policy, 1918-199-5, Series D (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern
ment Printing Office, 1956-1969-), III, 553» Hereafter
cited as DGFP.

vent some of its animosity against Russia in the early years
of the war by accepting over two thousand Finnish volunteers,
and training them as a unit to form the.27th Jaeger Battalion,
which later served as the nucleus of Finland's officer corps
during the War of Liberation.
The first Russian Revolution and the demise of the
Provisional Government in November of 1917 caused the Finns
to begin their first serious move for political sovereignty.
With the Bolsheviks in power, the conservative segment of ,
the Finnish Diet felt that it was time to terminate its '
relationship with Russia.

While still afraid that the

monarchy might re-establish its rule, the Diet passed a
weakly-worded recognition of de_ facto Independence "f or :the ..
time being” on November 15» 191?®

Later,, on December •!, a

much stronger declaration of independence was read in the•
Senate.

Now for that independence to become a reality, the

Russian troops which remained in Finland and the radical
Finnish socialists had to be purged from the political
scene.2
The German Government now began to negotiate with Lenin
for the recognition of Finnish independence.

Already com

mitted to a policy of recognizing the independence of national
groups within the Empire, Lenin formally declared that he

2
WJ » Hampden Jackson, Finland (New York: MacMillan Co.,
19^ 0 ), 85 .

recognized Finland’s sovereignty on January 14, 1918.^
Finland’s War of Independence had now become a civil
war.

The Finnish radicals, augmented by the 37,000 Russian

troops in Finland, were more than a match for the hastilyassembled forces of the conservative White Guard,

The

Finnish Red Guard quickly gained control of the industrial
centers and' the entire southern half of the country.

On

January 28,. the Reds captured Helsinki, and the legitimate
government was forced to flee westward to Turku,

On the

same day that the revolutionaries entered the capital, they
proclaimed Finland to be a Socialist Workers’ Republic.^
One day prior to the Red- coup d'etat in Helsinki, the
Senate had asked General Carl Gustav Mannerheim to become
the Commander-In-Chief of the Finnish forces,

Mannerheim

was a member of one of the few noble families in Finland,
and his. military credentials were impressive,

The General

had. spent thirty-seven years in the Russian Imperial Army
and had served In the past two Russian wars.

He was thor

oughly acquainted with both the nobility and the top poli
tical leaders of Europe, and his popular prestige in Finland
seemed capable of calming much of the conservative

O

Hampden Jackson, Finland (New York: MacMillan Co.,
1940), 8?.
^Carl Gustav Mannerheim, M e m o i r s trans, by Count Eric
Lewenhaupt (New York: E.P. Dutton ,and Co,, 1954)., 134.
Hereafter cited as Mannerheim.

6
factionalism that existed in the country,,

Mannerheim agreed

to lead the army on the one condition that the Senate would
not ask for either German or .Swedish intervention.^

Marshal

Mannerheim believed that the Finns, bolstered by the return
of the. highly disciplined 27th Jaeger Battalion from Germany,
would be, enough to defeat the larger but highly disorganized
Red Guard.

What Mannerheim wanted to avoid at all cost-was

a close association with a foreign power which might lead"-'.'
Finland into a serious political compromise in the future.
It will never be known If the Finns-could have estab-,lished their own independence, for, unknown to Mannerheim,.
Senator Pehr Svlnhufvud had been negotiating for, German aid
since December of 1917*

7

The Germans were not quick to give,

assistance to the Finns other than releasing the 27th Jaeger
Battalion for service In the civil war.

:The German sympathy

was all for Finland, but it was willing to give aid only In
.so far as it did not detract from their own war effort.
On February 17» the first of the Jaegers landed at
Q

Vaasa with war material purchased in Russia by'the Germans ,0
On February 18, the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk
broke down, freeing the Germans to aid the Finns and in .turn

■%an.nerhe im, 1^7 ■

6Ibid.s 135.
7Ibid., 152.
8lbid.

?
help themselves by adding pressure on the Russians via a
second front.

The German Government was still uneasy about

supplying aid to the Finns, but the-military convinced it
that German intervention would place additional pressure on
Russia and eventually lead to the elimination of any Allied
attempt to land at

Murmansk,

^

General Ludendorf stated that

the intervention would be purely in the best interests of’
o
10
Germany«-v
Mannerheim, although bitterly disappointed, decided to
remain in command so that he could try to restrict the German
participation in the war.

He demanded of and got a declara-.

tion from General Ludendorf stating that the German corps
in Finland would be under Mannerheim*s command and the
Germans would not try to interfere in Finnish domestic
affairs, 11

Mannerheim also told the British that he would

do everything he

could to preserve Finnish neutrality, and

he firmly stated

that the presence of German troops on Fin

nish soil did not mean that Finland had entered the war’.'as.
an ally of the Central Powers•
German troops began to arrive
Baltic Division,

under the command of Major-General Count .

% a n n e rhe im, 159'

1QIbia,, 156.
U Ibid., 156-157.

12Ibid., 169.

on April 3, whenthe

8
von der Goltz, landed at ilanko. J

The number of the German

troops which took -part in the campaign has been estimated to
have been anywhere between 10,000 and 20,0005 whatever their
exact number, their presence brought about a rapid destruc
tion of the Red Guard.

The rebel government fled from

Helsinki the day the first German troops landed, and the
Germans, assisted by the Finnish White Guard, were able to
recapture the capital on the 18th.

By May 16, the Red Giiard

had been completely crushed and Marshal Mannerheim led a
victory parade into Helsinki.
Immediately after the civil war, the Finns decided to
choose a .German prince to reign as the constitutional monarch
of their country.

The Finns sought this tie with Germany

because they were not yet confident that they would be able
to retain their independence by themselves.

There still

remained the threat that Russia, once its own civil war
ended, would again try to incorporate Finland Into the USSR.
Although German soldiers remained in Finland, there is no
indication that Germany attempted to pressure the Finns into
making -this decision»
In May of 1918, the Finnish Diet, still convinced that
Germany was not yet headed for defeat, elected the pro-German
Senator Svinhufvud to act as Regent.

He immediately began

negotiations with Kaiser Wilhelm to see if he would put

■^Mannerhe irn, 173•

■forward ones of his sons to reign in Finland..

The Kaiser

refused the crown for his sons, but he'' did suggest his
.brother-in-law. Prince Frederick Karl of Hesse.

On October 19

the Diet elected Prince Frederick•king by a vote of
seventy-five to twenty-five .• Prince Frederick, sensing- the
imminent German defeat, refused the crown.

When the armi

stice was signed, Svinhufvud resigned, and Marshal Mannerheim,
whom the Finns hoped would.be more acceptable to the Allies,
was chosen uo rake his place.
Germany’s defeat in 1918 ended its extensive influence
in Finnish affairs. A defeated-Germany could no longer
offer to Finland the necessary guarantees against Russian
aggression.

Finland now had to try to steer a neutral course

while it tried to gain protection by beginning to associate
itself with Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries.
During the post-war years, German relations with
Finland continued to be correct, but there were two foreign
policy changes made by the Weimar Republic which caused
Finland to grow cool toward Berlin.

In 1922 when Germany

signed-the Rappalo Treaty and again in 1926 when the first
Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed, Finland began
to feel that Germany was beginning to pave the way for a
future settlement of the Polish problem.

The Finns believed

that a Busso-German understanding on Eastern Europe would ■

"1 uj/

'Mannerheim, 18 0
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bring Finland into the Russian sphere ox" influence.

In

order to escape from being included into the Soviet sphere,
Finland continued to draw closer to Great Britain and
Sweden, and, at the same time, maintain friendly relations
with both Germany and the Soviet Union.

Worried by the

Busso-German Non-Aggression Pact, Finland did not seek
guarantees of protection from Germany; it instead began
negotiations In 192? for a non-aggression treaty with Moscow,
After nearly four years of interrupted.talks, the pact was
signed in January, 1932* 1^

This, the B'inns believed, would

bring the Soviets to believe that Finland was preparing only
for the defense of Its borders and not searching for any
alliances that would lead, to an offensive war.
The Finns also knew that friendly gestures toward the
Soviet Union would not be enough to maintain their neutrality
during a major war.

They knew that Russia believed that

Finland was not strong enough to prevent a German occupation,
and they also realized that the Russians feared that the
pro-German sentiment in Finland would help to facilitate any
German .attempt to conquer the country.

The fact that Finland

had outlawed the communist party in 1930 and the growth of
a Nazi-oriented Patriotic peoples* Party within Finland did
not helo to quell the Soviets* doubts.

1c
■‘■-'Arnold J. Toynbee, ed„» Survey of International Affairs,
1920~1923 (Oxford; Oxford University Press\' 1927J ,'2^1.

11
In 1921, Finland had considered entering into a. proposed
Baltic bloc consisting of Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and
Finland,

Upon closer evaluation of this alignment, Finland

felt that a treaty with Poland would further involve it in
future.Russo-German disputes,

In the mid-1930*s, Finland

definitely decided that it would rather be thought of as a
Scandinavian neutral rather than a part of any Baltic bloc,
Sweden, the major Scandinavian power, was not particularly
desirous of entering into any Nordic alliance with Finland,
It realized that an alliance with Finland, would perhaps lead
to a future confrontation with Russia., and in 1936 Sweden '
sought to establish its complete neutrality by announcing

■

in the League of Nations that It did not wish to enter into
any "regional commitments,"

The Swedes also announced that

they would not become involved in any sanctions that the
League should happen to apply to any aggressor nation.

Under

these circumstances, Finland found it Impossible to associateitself with Sweden.^
During the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938s Sweden began
to re-evaluate Its policy of complete neutrality.

Alarmed

by the growing German power, Sweden sought to bolster its
defenses without unduly arousing Germany.

In August, 1933,

Finland and Sweden began talks on a joint guarantee and'
refortification of the Aaland Islands,

1^
°Manne rhe im, 286,

The islands were very
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important to both countries.

For Sweden, they represented

a means to protect its eastern coast and control the entrance
to the Gulf.of Bothnia; for Finland, they now represented a
chance to become associated with Sweden,

Previously, in

1921, Sweden and Finland had almost gone to war over the
islands.

The dispute was settled by the League of Nations

through a special commission appointed to investigate the
status of the islands.

By the Aaland Convention of 1921,

the League decided that Finland should retain possession of
the islands, but they should be demilitarized and guaranteed
by the signators of the convention.

Now that the fortifica

tion of the islands was mutually advantageous to both Finland
and Sweden, they began their plans by seeking the approval
of the change in the islands" status from the convention's
signators,

Germany, as one of the guarantors, was expected

to offer the loudest objections to the refortification, 1?(
The development of the Swedo-Finnish talks had caught
the Germans off guard.

Previously, the German Foreign Office

had believed that the Aaland question was one of the major
factors which prevented any understanding between Finland
and Sweden,

18

The Belch could not afford to take the refor

tification plans lightly, because much of its iron ore from
Sweden came through the Gulf of Bothnia.

^?Manne rhe ini, 290,
18DGP?s v, 555.

The Foreign Office

1.3
notified. Ambassador von Bluecher that he was not to reply to
any questions on the German position on the proposed reforti
fication; If any Inquiries were made, he was to say that he
IQ
had no instructions on the matter. y

As the German policy

on the Aalands began to take shape, it appeared that the
Reich would probably have no objections to the refortifica
tion.

Germany had no aggressive designs .on Sweden, and-It

felt that the joint occupation of the Islands would help to
20
keep them out of Russia's hands.
The Germans knew that •
Finnish Foreign Minister Iiolsti was playing on Sweden’s,
fear of Germany in order to bring about the agreement, but
the Foreign Office felt that as long as Sweden's, neutrality
was respected, the iron ore shipments would continue»^
Germany also felt that the Scandinavian countries hoped to
maintain the status quo in the North.

The Munich Agreement

had generated much anti-German spirit in the North, but all
of the Scandinavian countries continued to follow a course
of strict neutrality.
On November 21, 1933, von Bluecher cabled a position
paper to the Foreign Office.

In this report he stated that,

while the Finnish right wing’ and the officers' corps did not

19pGFP, V, 596-59?.
20Ibid., 597-593.
2iIhid,» 601,
22Ibid.f 604-607.

fear a German attack, the Social Democrats, who now con
trolled a majority in the Diet, were aiming the Aaland;- /
defenses at Germany, not .Russia,

He also mentioned that- if ...

the northern Aaland Islands which commanded the Kvarken
Straits were fortified Germany's iron ore shipments would
b e ’seriously endangered.

With this warning in mind, the

problem was referred to the German High, Command (OKH)«'. It
decided In January, 1939? that the fortifications should not
be objected to even if they were directed at Germany,

It

was more important for the Reich to know that they could.also
be used as a defense against Russian designs in the

area.

OKH believed that the demilitarization should be limited to
the southern islands and that German approval’ should be made
contingent upon the receipt of a Swedish guarantee that Iron
ore shipments would continue in case Germany became involved
in a war and an additional guarantee that Sweden would pro
tect these shipments in their transit through the Gulf of
Bothnia,

oh.

' Although the German Government had now given its

tacit approval to the plan, minor reservations were still
held on the number of Swedish troops to be stationed on the
islands.

No objection would be made to Sweden's participa

tion In the construction of the defenses and an almost carte
blanche approval would be given to the Finnish involvement.

23.DGFP, v, 610-613.
24Ibid.8s 613,

15
but the High Command still wanted to make sure that Sweden
would .in no way endanger Germany's best interests in the
area.
The German Government had warmed to the Aaland fortifi-.
cation, but the Russians were adamant in their objections...
To the Soviet Union, the defenses would not be considered .as '
a determent to Nazi aggression; they would be looked upon as.
a Germa/n way station on the road to an attack on Russia.

The

USSR had communicated a message to the Finnish Foreign Office
which claimed that Germany and Finland had negotiated a
secret agreement that would place the Aaland fortifications '
at Germany's disposal in case of war.

The whole Aaland'

question, which had begun as an attempt by Finland to asso
ciate itself with Sweden and Scandinavian neutrality, had
now turned into a shuffling for position in the Baltic by
Germany and Russia.
Throughout February of 1939? the German Foreign Office
continued to withhold its final approval of the fortification.
In March, Lithuania ceded Kernel to Germany, and Great Britain
announced its guarantee of Poland.

As the situation in

Europe grew more tense, Finland became even more anxious to
begin the fortifications.

On April 2, the Foreign Secretary

of the German Foreign Office, Baron Ernst von Weizsaecker,

25dopp 9 v s 625-626.

26dgfp, VI, 229-230.

16

announced that Germany would not object to the fortifica
tions, but it did object to Sweden being the only member of
the Aaland Convention to participate in the islands’ defense,
'weizsaecker did hint that this objection would be dropped
if Sweden would issue a positive statement that would assure
Germany of a continuation of iron ore shipments at a pre-war
27

level in case a major war did begin, r
To further secure Germany’s position in the Baltic*
Weizsaecker instructed the Reich’s ambassadors in Helsinki*
Stockholm* Oslo* and Copenhagen to broach the question of
future non-aggression pacts.

On May 9? the delegates of

the Scandinavian countries met at Oslo and decided that they
wanted to continue a p o l i c y of strict non-alignment,

29

Denmark eventually negotiated a non-aggression pact with
Germany, but for the moment the Nordic nations stood as one
on this matter.

In a separate note to Germany, Finland made ■

it known that it would not be able to enter into a
non-aggression agreement.

The refusal to negotiate an agree

ment caused Weizsaecker to view Finland’s foreign policy
with scorn.

Finland had refused the proposed pact by saying

that it did not want to become a "pawn" in any political

2?DGFP, VI, 28^-286,
28Ibid,, 359.
2^Vaino Tanner, The Winter War-(Stanford, California:
■Stanford University Press, 195?!! l6 « Hereafter cited as
Tanner.

17
combinations concerning the great powers.

Weizsaecker was

■bemused with this stand because Finland continued to retain
its non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.

He felt that

Finland would soon have to make the choice of a political
alliance with either Germany or the USSR, and he knew that
an association with Russia was unthinkable for Finland.;
On May 2, the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von
Ribbentrop, cabled his approval of the joint fortification
to von Bluecher, but he added that he expected Sweden to
continue to pursue a course of strict.neutrality toward
Germany.

The German approval of the Swedish participation

stemmed in.part from the recent Franco-British attempt to
begin an encirclement of Germany in order to guarantee
Poland.

Even if relations between German;/ and Sweden were

strained, the sanction would help to ease the situation in
the Baltic.

For Germany, 'the optimum settlement of the ques

tion would have been a unilateral defense of the islands by
Finland, but the Finns* desire to become associated with
Sweden prevented this solution. 30
The Russians had protested against the refortification,
and they raised the volume of that protest once they had
heard of the German approval.

In May the Aaland question was

brought before the League of Nations, and Russia hoped to
intervene there.

Although Finland and Sweden had gained the

3°DG-F'Pt VI, 402

18
consent of all of the signators of the 'convention, Russia
stated that its approval or denial should be considered, as
the fortifications directly affected its national security.
On May 27, Alexander Maisky, Russia's Ambassador to London,
told.the League that the fortifications could be used to
"bottle up" Russia in the Gulf of-Finland,

The Ambassador

also pointed out that there was no guarantee in the
1

Swedo-Finnish plan which would prevent these fortifications
from being used by a hostile third power-against the Soviet
Union,^1

Of course, no paper guarantee would ever satisfy

the Soviet Union.

On May 31» Molotov said that the USSR

desired either a continuation of the status quo or an invitation to join in the defense of the islands. 32
entirely too much for Sweden,

This was

It nox\r found itself like

Finland, caught between the conflicting aims of Germany and
the Soviet Union.

In order to avoid this seeraingly insol-

vable dilemma, Sweden told Finland that, it was no longer
interested in the project,
MO sooner had the Aaland question passed momentarilyfrom the scene than the Baltic came Into the general problem
of peace in Europe once again, this time in respect to the
Pranco-Brltish attempt to gain a mutual assistance treaty

31

Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy,
1933-19^1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), III,
33T--333'V"" Hereafter cited as SDFP.
^Mannerheim, 301*

19
with Russia in order to curb Germany's desire to move into
Poland.

Both Great Britain and France had been thoroughly

alarmed when Hitler began to intimate that he. wanted to seek
a solution to the polish problem by annexing Danzig and
building a road across the Polish Corridor,

By past expe

riences they knew that once Germany had gained these conces
sions it would not be long before it tried to eliminate the
corridor and perhaps all of Poland as well.

Britain had at

first tried to show Hitler its intentions by guaranteeing
Poland's neutrality on March 31•

it now.sought to strengthen

that guarantee by bringing Russia into -a.mutual assistancepact,

, .

Russia entered the talks with Great Britain and France
with caution and a well-developed concept of what it wanted
to gain through the negotiations.

Russia knew that if Bri-

tain's plan to encircle Germany were to become a concrete,.
political reality it' had to have Russian support.
Union did not intend to sell this support cheap.-

The Soviet
It-.wanted

three things in exchange for its cooperation: (1) 'a FrancoBritish guarantee in case of a German attack on Russia,
(2) permission to assist Poland in case of a German attack
on that country, and (3 ) the right to be considered the protector of Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, 33

David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy,
1939-19-22 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press,
19^2)7"v0» Hereafter cited as Dallin.

The first problem which arose in the talks was the
Soviet concern with the Franco-British guarantee of mutual,
assistance to Russia.

The British and French had proposed

that Russia should come to their aid in the event of a war
arising from a Nazi attack on Poland or Rumania,,

It,

however, was not stated in the text of the proposed treaty
that Great Britain and France would come to the assistance
of Russia in case of a German attack on the Soviet Union.
The British contended that this need not be spelled out ;in
the treaty because a German attack on Russia, would have to
be preceded by an attack on Poland, which then would auto
matically bring complete military assistance to the Soviet
Union.

Russia pointed out that it not only felt threatened

by Germany on its western borders, but on its northern bor
ders as well.

The USSR would not feel secure until the Baltic

was also guaranteed.-^

The whole problem of the Russian

guarantee of Poland was further complicated when the poles
informed the British that they had no desire to have the
Soviet Union participate in their defense.
Perhaps the problem that Poland presented could have
been cleared up, but the Russians chose to use the British
and French desire to gain a guarantee of Poland as a lever to

'hip-

■>'F . L. Woodward and Rohan Butler- (eds,), Documents on
British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939; Third Series (London:’
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953)? VI, 50-51* Hereafter
cited as British Documents.

21
keep the question of a Russian guarantee of the Baltic open,
Russia seemingly would not come to terms on Poland until
Britain and Prance came to terms on the Baltic.-'-'
The initial Soviet demands of Pranco-British assistance
in the .Baltic was a frank and realistic expression of the
Russian fear of Nazi aggression from the north.

Pravda

stated the Russian position on the Baltic when it said that
even if the Baltic nations continued to be neutral this would
not prevent Germany from launching an attack against them.
Once the war was on, these tiny nations could not hope to
hold their o w n . ^
The Russians then brought forth the proposal that they
should guarantee the Baltic in case of either direct or
indirect aggression by Germany,

37
• The question of "indirect

aggression" was the point on which the talks with Britain and
France ultimately

e

n

d

e

d

,^8

term "indirect aggression”

was at best a nebulous expression which pointed to a Soviet,
take over in the eastern Baltic area.

The USSR never did

specifically define what they meant by the terra, for its
vagueness would allow the Russians to interpret it as they
pleased once the British and the French agreed to its

-^Dallin, 32,
5DFF, III, 335.
-^Dallin, kl-kZ.
3s
ur'Did,, 29

inclusion in the treaty.

The Russians probably would have

interpreted "indirect aggression" as the development of any
Nazi fifth-column movement in the Baltic States or even any
heightening of tensions in Europe which the Soviets believed
to indicate an impending war.

If Russia, were-allowed to

construe the term’s 'meaning, even the slightest threat would
■be"' considered as a casus foederis.
The' British and the' French were now In a difficult, if
not an ironical, position.

The Russians would not cooperate

■in respect to the Polish guarantee without its own guarantee
of the Baltic nations.

Since the Baltic nations had informed

Britain that they did not want to be protected by the Soviet
Unionj the Inclusion of the indirect aggression clause in the
treaty, despite the objections of these smaller nations,
would simply be condoning one form of aggression in order to
prevent another.
The British did make a suggestion, which they hoped would
satisfy the Russian demand for security and still prevent it
from moving its forces Into the Baltic States whenever it
wished to.

The proposal was to Insert a clause in the treaty

which would call for "immediate consultations” in the event
of a threat of "indirect aggression" by Germany.

This would

perhaps calm the fears of the Baltic nations that-Russia
would act unilaterally in their defense.

Russia refused to

negotiate on the basis of the new proposal, because it
believed that Britain and France were too far from the Baltic

23
to offer any immediate assistance and -consultations on a
course of action -would be a disadvantage to Russia if an
39

immediate action wers called for. '
The rest of the talks degenerated into a dispute over
the semantics of the indirect aggression guarantee.

The

British went to almost every possible extreme, short of the
appeasement that Russia desired, in order to-bring about the
mutual assistance pact.

Perhaps the height of British

ingenuity and desperation was contained in Ambassador William
Seeds* proposal of June 16.

In this proposal to the

Russians he saids
If through the action of a European
Power, there arises a threat to the Inde
pendence or neutrality of another European
State, whether bordering on one of the
contracting countries or not, which one of
the contracting countries considers to con
stitute a menace to Its own security or to
the peace of Europe, the three Governments,
without prejudice to the action which one or
the other of them may take In the interest
of its own security or in the execution of
an' obligation of assistance win, at the
request of any one of them, immediately con
sult together to examine the situation -with
a view to deciding by common consent, should
the necessity arise, upon the application of
the mechanism of mutual assistance in con
formity with the principles of but Independ
ently of, the procedure of -the League of
Nations.
Language or good will could hardly be stretched any further,

39sdpp, III, 352-35^.
ji A

British Documents, VI, 98 .
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but still the Soviet Union refused the suggestion.
Hitler was worried about the talks at the Kremlin.

He'

felt that a successful completion of the negotiations would
stop the momentum of his foreign policy, and once the origi
nal impetus was lost there was a strong possibility that,
not only would his aggressive designs on Poland be checked,
but he would be forced to begin to make a gradual withdrawal
from the gains he had made thus far.

For Hitler the con

tinuation of his strategy was directed at Poland, and it
seemed that a victory there was contingent upon the outcome
of the British attempt to encircle Germany-,

Both Britain

and France had warned Hitler that there would not be another
Munich over Poland; the Western Allies were prepared to make
a stand and they let the Fuehrer know this in the strongest
possible terras.
Germany now began to feel isolated.

Japan had recently,

refused to sign a military alliance with the Reich, and
Weizs&ecker had told Neville Henderson, the British Ambas
sador to Berlin, that he was " .•• alarmed, at .Britain's
efforts to encircle Germany by the attempt to conclude atreaty at almost any jprice with Russia,"

4l

Hitler was now

forced to lessen the tension in Danzig and the Polish
Corridor while he waited for a chance to strengthen his own
position.

^British Documents, VI, 59 •
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On Hay 21, Hitler signed the Mutual Assistance Treaty
with Italy, and on the very next day he Informed his High
Command that "There Is no question of sparing Poland and we
ca
x.re left with the decision: To attack Poland at the first
hp
suitable opportunity."
On June ?, Hitler tried to throw
a,stumbling block In the way of the Allied negotiations with
■the Soviet Union by signing non-aggression pacts with Latvia
'and Estonia.

Finland was also offered a similar agreement

but.It refused, saying that it felt no need for any pact when
relations, between the two countries were already peaceful.
In reality, Finland was still trying to placate Russian
doubts by avoiding any type of treaty with Germany.
When Hitler saw that the Allied negotiations with the
USSR were breaking down, he tried to establish a detente
with Russia,,

In late May, Weizsaecker had informed the

German Minister to Moscow, Count von Sohulenburg, that eco
nomic talks with the Soviet Union would be
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Previously, it had been felt that Russia, would only use talks
with Germany to pressure the French and the British into an
agreement on the Baltic.

Weizsaecker had said that the

Anglo-Russian. pact 'would be hard to prevent, and a failure

h-2
' Allan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York:
Harper and Row, 1962),. 509.
^Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (eds,),
Nazi-Soviet Relations (New York: Didier, 1948), 15-1?.
Hereafter cited as Nazi-Soviet Relations.
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of Nazi-Soviet talks would only produce "a peal of Tartar
hj;
laughter," ’v
Dr. Karl Schnurre, the Director of the German Foreign
Office's European and Baltic sections of. the Commercial
Policy Division, was sent to Moscow to reactivate trade
negotiations, while .Ambassador Schulenburg began to put out
feelers for a possible non-aggression pact.

The talks with

Russia went rapidly through July, and a frenzy of. diplomatic
activity took place in August as Hitler's projected date for
the invasion of Poland neared.
On July 27» Schnurre reported, "Our assumption that the
Baltic countries and Finland are in our sphere of influ
ence ... completed for the Soviet Union the feeling of being
lie

menaced,'’ J

S’chnurre continued his report by saying that he

had assured the Russians that the German Government was no
longer looking in the direction of the Baltic and that the
recently-concluded non-aggression pacts with Latvia and
Estonia should lend credence to that fact,^°

Exactly one day

before Schnurre filed this report, von Bluecher had assured
Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that the rumor that Germany
was going to give the Baltic States to Russia was "propoganda

kip

Nazi-Soviet Relations, 9 ,

^Ibid., 33 .
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fairy-tales ,"'1 and two days later Finland was told that this
story was "being circulated by the British to disrupt the'
Nazi-Soviet talks.
On August *4-, Schulenburg gave Russia its final assurance
that there would be no clash of interests in the Baltic, ^
and on the 5th Hitler told his Foreign Office to make every
attempt to close the a g r e e m e n t . O n c e the issue of the
Baltic was settled, the partition of Poland was agreed, upon,
and on-August 23, the Non-Aggression Pact was signed and:’••
placed into effect before it was even formally, ratified 'by;
either side.
Besides the formal text of the Non-Aggression Pact,
which' was communicated to the rest of- the world, the treaty also contained a secret protocol.

Article;1 of this secret

protocol placed Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia
within the Soviet sphere of influence,

Germany had abandoned

Finland and the rest of the eastern Baltic in order to pro
ceed with its plans for Poland.

Finland had looked upon

Germany as a possible ally in a time of crisis, and now
Germany had created a crisis for Finland.

When the Soviet

Union began to implement the provisions of the secret

^DGFP, VI, 1002.
^Ibid., 1003-100**.
"^Nazi-Soviet Relations, 39■

5°Dallln, 38
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protocol, Germany looked the other way.

Finland was' now

summarily abandoned by Germany, and it would have to face
the threat of Russian expansion unassisted by a single
tective alliance.

The German attitude toward Finland from the signing of
the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union until the end
of the first Russo-Finnish war can best be described as
negative*

There was pro-Finnish sentiment in Germany just

as there were pro-German feelings in Finland, but the Secret
Protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Pact had placed Finland and the
Baltic Nations

within the Soviet sphere of influence,

Ger

many knew that the pact had freed the Soviet Union to carry
out its designs in t’
pis area, but the Reich condoned the
Soviet aggression because it felt that it was politically
and militarily expendable for the moment.

These countries

were to be looked upon as pieces of real estate to be bartered
or exchanged for other territories considered to be of
greater value to the expansion of the Reich,
In August of'1939» Hitler had focused his attention on
Poland..

It was to the East that Lebensraum was to be found,

and Poland, was to be the next target for Hitler’s Master
Strategy.

The Fuehrer hoped to partition Poland a la Munich

-T
iThe Soviet Union thought of Finland as being part of
the Baltic Bloc, while Finland thought of itself as being a
Scandinavian country.

but he did not discount a military take-over*

As long as

the Soviet Union remained uncommitted to rany- of the power
blocs then forming, Hitler knew that the Allies would attempt,
to reach an accord with Russia and complete their plan of
encircling Germany.

The Soviet Union's price for its

cooperation in the Allied plan to curtail Hitler's advance
had been freedom of action in the eastern Baltic, a price
that the Allies had been unwilling to pay.

Hitler, however,

was w i n i n g to meet the Soviet demands, and by meeting them
he gained his own freedom of initiative to continue against
Poland.
The decision to abandon Finland to the USSR did present
two major tactical .problems to Germany.

A Soviet occupation

o f •Finland would cut off valuable Finnish trade and give the
Soviets control of the eastern shores of the Baltic and the
Gulf of Bothnia.

The control of the Gulf of Bothnia In turn:

would possibly lead to Russian influence in northern Sweden
and this would represent a possible threat■to. the all-important
shipments of Swedish iron ore from this .area.
vantages , however, lay in the future.

These disad

Hitler was willing to

risk them because he believed that it was imperative to con
tinue the momentum of his present policy in the- East.

This

momentum seemingly could only be prolonged by an immediate
solution to the Polish question.
It did not take the Soviet Union long to take advantage
of .the- new freedom of action it had gained in the Baltic and

px
Poland,

On September 1?, only two and. one half weeks after

the Nazis launched their offensive against Poland, the Soviet
Union broke off diplomatic relations with Warsaw'-” ana began
to occupy the territory which had been reserved for it by
Article 2 of the Non-Aggression pact's Secret Protocol,

3

On September 28, A Mutual Assistance Treaty was signed with
h,
Estonia, and an Identical agreement was negotiated with
Latvia on October 5*^

The treaties were really not negotiated;

they were forced upon the countries.

The Soviet Union hoped

to. complete.the expansion of its buffer zone against Germany
while the Reich was still occupied with the Allies,

Since

the Non-Aggression Pact prohibited the. use of Germany as the
country against which the treaties were to be directed, the
Soviet Union said that It was trying to protect these nations
from the threat of British aggression,

Lithuania x-jas treated

with a little more diplomatic respect since it shared no
common borders with the USSR and because Germany had terri
torial interests in Meraeland,°

2SDFP, h i ,

A treaty, which called for

374-376.

"'ibid,, 359-361.
^Dallin, 83-85•
^Albert M. Tarulis, Soviet policy Toward the Baltic
States, 1918-1990 (Notre Dame", Indiana.* University of Notre
Dame Press, 1959)™!. 155»
^Germany had earlier acquired the port of Memel, which
lay adjacent to East Prussia,
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“mutual consultations” in the event of direct or implied
n

aggression against Lithuania, was signed on October 10.'

The wording of these three treaties may have been slightly
different, but the intent of each was quite similar.

By

June of 1940, all three countries' had been absorbed by the
Soviet Union in order to ’’protect" them from the Allies.
Soviet- plans to gain security along its northern borders
began long before the autumn of 1939*

As early as April 19,

1938, Boris Jartsev, the Second. Secretary to the Soviet •
'Legation in HeIsinki, began secret talks with Foreign Minister
Rudolph Holsti,

8 jartsev informed Holsti that, while the

Soviet Union respected Finland’s territorial sovereignty,
It was convinced that Germany was planning an attack on
Russia through Finland.

If this happened, the USSR would be

forced to advance and meet the attack on Finnish soil.

If

Finland would guarantee to resist any German attack, the
Soviet Union would aid it with both men and material,

There

were other proposals of a very vague nature, but the main
tenor of the talks was that Finland should, act in concert
i

with the USSR in the defense of Russia’s northern borders,
Finland, which had no interest in the proposal, could not

?Sowle1 Documents, III, 380-382.
O
The talks were so secret that only a few Finns knew that
they were being conducted. Not even President Kallio was
informed about them. The Russian secrecy was so strict that
the Russian Ambassador to Helsinki and Litvinov, the Soviet
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, remained ignorant of them.
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afford to dismiss the suggestion immediately.

The'talks

continued in secrecy at infrequent intervals for the rest
Q
of the year, but no decisions were reached on the matter.x
In August of 1939> when tensions in Europe were being
heightened by talk of a Nazi offensive against Poland, the
Soviet Union felt that it was necessary to increase its
pressure on Finland in order to come to an agreement on the
northern borders.

Jartsev announced that his government

ranted; (1) a written guarantee that Finland would attempt
to repel any German invasion and accept Soviet aid in its
effort to do so, (2) a thirty-year lease on the island of
Hogland in the■Gulf of Finland, and (3) a bilateral fortifi<A
cation of the Aaland Islands«xu
All of these Soviet requests were clearly an attempt to
protect Russia from a possible German attack.

The Aaland

Islands were important to. Russia In that, by sharing In their
defense., the Soviet Union would be in a position to sever the
main line of sea communications between Finland and Germany,
and, at the same time, enable the. Russians to block the
entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia .and thereby keep Swedish iron
ore from reaching Germany,

The naval station at Hogland.

would allow the Soviet Baltic Fleet to seal off the entry to

% a x Jacobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War ('Cam
bridge; Harvard University Press, 19 6T), 7-12.
in
Mannerheim, 29^.
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the Gulf of Finland and protect Leningrad and the naval .
bas e at Krons tadt•
Finland’s .adamant stand against the proposals ms.
severely complicated by the new Nazi-Soviet accord.

The

Finnish Foreign Office had always hoped that the natural ani
mosity between Germany and the Soviet Union would act as a
counterbalance to prevent an attack on Finland by either of
rn e rwo p owe r s .11
, -

,

Instead of softening their demands in order to reach a
compromise with Finland, the Soviets* terms became harsher
as the talks continued,

Now, instead of asking for the lease

of territory which lay on the outer periphery of Finland, ;■
Molotov, who, with Stalin, had replaced Maxim Litvinov as f
the director of Soviet foreign policy, demanded that the
Finns give Russia a thirty-year lease on the port of Hanko'
r~\

and rectify the border along the Karelian' Isthmus. ^

Hanko

was the major Finnish port on the Baltic, and the Soviets
believed that it was there that the Germans would try to make
an entrance into Finland,

In 1939s the Karelian border was

only twenty miles from Leningrad.

Molotov wanted to move it

farther north to take the city out of artillery range and

11
MannsrheIm, 295•
12
“Manneme Im, 311.
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also to destroy the effectiveness of the Mannerheim Line.
When the Finns noticed the calm assurance of the Soviets'
at the conference table, they quickly began to suspect' that
the USSR and Germany had come to an agreement■on the disposal
•of-Finland.

The Finnish Foreign Office immediately began to.

ask' Berlin if there were more to the Non-Aggression Fact than
what had already been published,
Three days after the signing of the Pact, Foreign
Minister Erkko asked the German Ambassador if any agreement
concerning Finland had been made with the Soviet Union.
Von Bluecher informed Erkko that the Pact contained no secret
protocol, and the Non-Aggression Treaty was beneficial to
Finland in that it removed the .Baltic from the war.

Arne

Wuorimaa, Finland *s Ambassador to Germany, was given a simi
lar explanation in Berlin.^

To prevent any diplomatic

indiscretions by his staff, Eibbentrop cabled the legations
in Finland, Latvia, and Estonia to tell them not to mention
36
anything about any new spheres of influence.'

•^The Mannerheim Line was Finland's major line of defense
against the Soviet Union. It was not composed of man-made
fortifications comparable to the Maginot or Seigfreia Lines,
and its main defensive advantages lay in the.swamps and
'marshes of the area, which made a mechanized assault against
the area all but impossible.
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Germany's position was clear: it had
pacts with the Baltic Nations, and it had

non-aggression
declared its

intent to respect the neutrality of the Scandinavian coun
tries, but the Reich was still willing-to allow Russia to
proceed unobstructed in its plans for

the North,

Not all members of the German

Foreign Office viewed

this new diplomatic tack with calm assurance.

Ambassador

Bluecher"*"^ tried desperately to keep Germany from ignoring
Finland's fate.-1^

In September, as Finland sought to miti

gate the Soviet demands and gain approval of its plans for a
bilateral fortification of the Aaland Islands with Sweden,
Blue cher asked his Foreign Office to intercede oh '..Finland-4'?
behalf in its talks with the Soviet U n i o n T h i s

was the

first, but not the last time he -would try to involve Germany
in the talks,

Weizsaecker, the Foreign Office's Foreign

Secretary, replied to Bluecher's request .x^'ith a firm no#
This suggested course of action -would only involve Germany in
unnecessary disputes with the Soviet Union and make it appear
as if the Reich was not respecting the spirit of the Secret
Protocol,

20

At the end of September, Bluecher attenuated to

17
“"'Wipert von Bluecher's diplomatic career extended well
back into the days of the Weimar Republic. He was not overly
sympathetic with the Nazis, and, since his assignment to
p
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assess Finland's new position as a result of the Nazi-Soviet
accord.

He stated that Finland’s econoray had been drasti

cally altered now that the war had all but cut it off from
Great Britain.

He also felt that Germany's reserved atti

tude toward Finland had caused a serious deterioration in the
ties between the two nations.

The Finns believed that

Germany's decision to make friends with the Soviet Union had
been the primary cause ox its current dilemma with Russia.
Bluecher wont on in order to revive German interest in Fin
land by sayings "He should utilize «„e the economic poten
tials of the country and develop our position so that it will
be maintained even after the war.”"'

In view of the fact

that this assessment and suggestion was made just one day
prior to the signing of the German-Soviet Boundary and
Friendship Treaty, It did little to cause the German Foreign
Office to develop a sympathetic attitude toward Finland.
The Finnish Foreign Office also continued in Its efforts
to establish a dentente with Germany.

Ambassador Wuorlmma“

told Weizsaecker that the Soviet Union was beginning to
change the entire .balance of power in the Baltic.

He hinted

that Russia was rapidly trying to gain strategic positions
in Finland which could only be directed against Germany.
Wuorimaa reminded Weizsaecker that Finland had declared its
neutrality in the war and had begun to try to eliminate

38
pro-British sentiment in the country; in return for these
gestures of good will, he felt that Germany should ask the
Soviet Union to lessen its demands on Finland.

Weizsaecker

answered by chiding the ambassador over the fact that Finland
■had refused Germany's previous offer of a friendship treaty
and said' that the Beich was in no position to intervene :in
22
the Russo-Finnlsh conversations.
The negotiations were resumed on October 12, in Moscow*
Two days before they began, Blueeher again tried to portray
the seriousness of the situation to the Foreign Office in
Berlin.

The Finns had begun a partial mobilization of their

army in order to ready themselves for the Soviet threats that
they knew would accompany the Russian demands at the con
ference table.

Blueeher reported that anti-German sentiment

was on the rise in Finland and. that there had been incidents
against the local Kelchsdeutsehe and Volksdeutsche *

He

thought that the Soviet's incursion into Finland would cause
"grave consequences" and hoped that Germany could offer some
aid without altering its Baltic policy.^

Ribbentrop realized

that even the slightest German assistance to Finland would
violate the spirit of the Non-Aggression Pact and seriously
complicate the continuance of friendly Russo-German rela
tions .

The German Foreign Minister sternly ordered Blueeher

^^Nazi-Soviet Relations, 121-122.
23Ibid», 1231 and DGPP,' VIII, 251.

to follow the prescribed policy of neutrality and avoid any
personal speculation on the future course of events in
Finland.

Furthermore, Blueeher was ordered to discourage

ex-President Svinhufvud from making a trip to Berlin to ask
for assistance.

Svinhufvud*s pro-German sentiments were well

known and the Reich wished to avoid any embarassment that
his presence in Berlin would cause while the critical talks
were progressing in Moscow.

Ribbentrop ended his communique

with the phrase that had become his guideline to the situa
tion; " .,, Germany is not concerned with Russo-Finnish
problems’,"24
When the Russo-Finnish talks were resumed in Moscow on
October 12, Juho Paasikivi, the Finnish Ambassador to Sweden,
headed Finland's negotiations’ team.

He was also accompanied

by Vaino Tanner, then the Finnish Minister of Economics,, and
Colonel paasonen from Marshal Mannerheim*s staff,
and Stalin directed the Soviet diplomacy.

Molotov

The fact that

these two Soviet leaders maintained, exclusive control of the
Russian negotiations indicates the extreme seriousness .of
the talks.

Molotov informed the ’Finns that two questions

had to be settled at the conferences,

The Soviet Union had

to secure the safety of Leningrad and be completely satisfied
that Finland would maintain firm, friendly relations with
the USSR,

If these two points could not be settled In

^Mannerheim, 309-310.

Moscow, the Soviet.Union would be forced to use "other
2
methods” to achieve these ends, He continued to amplify his demands by stating that
Leningrad was to be protected through the rectification of
the Karelian border, and "firm and friendly" relations were
to be insured by a thirty-year lease on Hanko and the Soviet
0A
acquisition of five small islands in the Gulf of Finland.
The Firms were willing to discuss the ■islands,and the border,
but they refused to consider Hanko.

Hanko was very important

to the Finnish economy, and a Russian presence there would
seriously compromise the nation's defense system.

Since.the

Soviet acquisition of the islands in the Gulf of Finland
would effectively block the entrance to Leningrad, the Finns
believed that Russia, was only trying to gain a foothold inFinland in order to begin a more extensive program of con97

quest*"'

As the talks drew to a close, Paasikivi optimis-..

tidaily conjectured that Finland wanted to remain at peace.with the rest of the world and remain apart from all inci
dents which might bring it into a war,

Stalin answered this

p O

with an ominous, "That's impossible."
The German position of neutrality toward the

^ Soviet Documents, III, 382-384,
2^Tanner, 29»
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negotiations took an even more definite form after the
Moscow talks had ended in failure.

On October 15 and 16,

Sven Hedin, a Swedish industrialist and explorer, had talks
with Hitler and Goering on the future fate of the Northern
Reichsmarshal Goering informed Hedin that " ...

neutrals.

Finland will be attached to Russia."

The Fuehrer told him

that Germany would continue its present policy of neutrality
towards the North, and he believed that the Soviet demands
on Finland were justifiable•

Eitler■seemed piqued over, the

anti-Nazi feeling in the North, and he felt that Finland had
not been properly appreciative of the assistance that Germany
_ . pQ
had given it in ±9 1 0 ."^
The third and last round of the Russo-Finnish talks
began again in Moscow on October 23=

The negotiations

followed the same obstinate pattern that the other two
meetings had taken.

Molotov and Stalin continued to p:

for Kanko, while Finland had determined to retain the port
at any c o s t h

The talks were once again terminated at this

point and tentatively scheduled to resume once more in
November.

When the Finnish diplomats made their farewells

to Molotov and Stalin, the two communist leaders appeared to
be cheerful, and the Finns fully expected that the talks

OG
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would not be ended,,''
Even the official German news agency, DNB, was printing
stories which intimated that the talks would resume in a few
OO
days,-;
This, however, did not mean that the Reich was
trying to steer the negotiations to a peaceful conclusion,,
The Foreign Office remained as aloof as ever on the matter.
The only other indication that the German Government was
expecting a peaceful settlement came in an unofficial con
versation hetween Vaino Tanner and Ambassador von Schulenburg
at a dinner in Moscow,

Schulenburg informed Tanner that his

Foreign Office'presumed that there would be a settlement and
he expected Finland eventually to lease Hanko
At this point in the war, Germany could still afford to
ignore Finland.

The country represented no outstanding eco

nomic or military significance at the moment,

The only

German concern was the possibility of Sweden becoming involved
in the dispute between Russia and Finland*

Finland had con

tinued to try to rekindle Sweden's interest in a bilateral
defense of the Aalands throughout all of 1939«

The popular

sentiment in Sweden for such a cooperation was high, but the
Swedish Government was distinctly cautious*

In fact,,, the

Finns had but one strong ally in the Swedish cabinet who

Tanner,
32Ibid,, 77*
33Ibid *, 71,
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continued to promote the idea.

Swedish Foreign Minister

Rickard Sandler believed that the Soviet Union had designs
on Sweden as well as Finland, and he felt that a Russian
occupation of the Aalands represented a direct threat to
his country's s e c u r i t y . ^

Sandler continued to prompt the

Swedish Government to join Finland in the Aaland fortifica
tion, but his attempts were not successful.

He was even

tually relieved of his post for his strong stand on the
issue„
Sweden was not only afraid of Russia’s reaction to an
alliance with Finland, but it was also forced to measure the
'German views on the matter,

Sweden was the main source of

Germany’s supply of iron ore, and. if it were drawn into a
Russo-Finnish war as an active combatant, Germany’s rela
tionship with Sweden "would be seriously complicated in two
ways.

First of all, the Soviet Union would try to blockade

the Gulf of Bothnia-'

ana this would force Germany to face

the decision of whether or not it should respect the Soviet
move.

Secondly, the richest of the Swedish iron fields were

within easy reach of the Soviet Karelia,

These fields would

"5A
'Scandinavia Between Fast and West, ed. by Heinrich
Friis (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1950), 2??.
-^Tanner, 50*
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-' The Gulf of Bothnia was only used for the shipment of
iron ore to Germany in the spring, summer, and fall. The
Gulf froze over in late November, and remained ice bound
until Anril.

be very vulnerable to a Soviet attack and difficult to
defend if the German army attempted to protect them.

■
If

Sweden did become involved In a war with Russia, the only
other way that the 'Reich could protect Its interests in the
North would be to,ally Itself with the Soviet Union.

This

would be a difficult decision at a time when the war In the
Rest had not yet been decided.
Sweden, however, did not make Germany face any of these
theoretical problems.

Prime Minister Hansson, on October 27?

informed the Finnish Government that Sweden did not want to
consider the bilateral fortification plans, as it thought
that this scheme would involve the country in a war with the
.Soviet Union. 3?

Finland’s Isolation was now1 nearly complete,

and Germany’s Immediate concern in the North was relieved for’
the.moment,
In November, the Soviet Union decided that nothing
could be settled through a continuation of the talks with
Finland.

Instead of resuming the negotiations, it began to

,apply the military pressure it had threatened In the past.-*®
Later in the month, the USSR requested that the Finns with
draw the troops which were stationed along the Karelian

3?Tanner, 47-^8.
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J It Is difficult to document the Russian decision to
begin the war. It must have been considered as early as Octo
ber, because, at that time, Molotov had tried to get Arvo
Tuominen, a Finnish radical, to come from Sweden to Moscow in
order to discuss the details of forming a puppet Finnish Re
public • Tuominen refused to go and Kuusinenf was chosen instead.

b o r d e r . F i n l a n d moved the men back a few kilometers in
order to avoid any incidents which might provoke a Russian
jic>
attack.
This Finnish discretion was not enough. The .
Soviet Union claimed that a Finnish battery had fired on
■Russian soldiers stationed near the village of Mainila on
h'l
November 26.
The Soviets refused to listen to Finnish
appeals on the so-called "Mainila Shots" and the FinnishRussian Non-Aggression Pact was denounced in Moscow on the
28th.

On the morning of the 30th, the Russians launched.

a surprise air attack on Helsinki and the Winter War was
'43
Degun,
On December 1, the Soviet Union constructed and recog
nized a puppet Democratic Peoples' Government of the Finnish
Republic in the city of Terijoki.

0* ¥. Euusinen, a Finnish

radical, who had fought for the communists in the War of
Liberation in 1918, was chosen to head, the government.

By

December 3, the Soviets had "negotiated." a treaty with the
Kuusinen government which gave Russia all the territory that
All.

it..had demanded earlier. ’'

so
'' Sovle t Documents, III, 4Q1 *
'^Marine rhe im, 315»
^ Soviet Documents, III, 401.
Li9

,

““Ibid., 402,

^ I b id., 402-3o
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During the opening stages of the war, Finland was
anxious to seek peace.

Histo Ryti, a banker, was chosen to

head a new Finnish Government on December 1, and he tried to
resume negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Molotov, however,

refused to negotiate with the "Ryti-Tanner .Government,"’
saying that he would recognize only the settlement which had
been made by the Kuusinen regime in Terijoki.^
The Soviets desired and expected a speedy victory.

A

quick end to the hostilities would eliminate the possibility
o f 'other nations coming to the aid of Finland, preserve
Soviet military strength, and allow Russia to concentrate its
attention on the developments that were taking place in the
Balkans.

At first, only troops from the Leningrad garrison

were committed to the war, but it soon became apparent that
other units would be needed.

What victories■that were won in

December were all Finnish ones,^°
Germany did nothing to alter its stand of complete
indifference to Finland once the war had begun..

If anything,

the Reich's Foreign Office developed an even more decided
pro-Soviet line in order to allay any possible Russian sus
picions*

On December 2, Weizsaecker cabled all German

missions to inform them that they were to reject any sntiRussian notes that they might be asked to receive.

^ Soviet Documents, ill, 411.
^Mannerheim, 327“3469 passim,.
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'German ministers were to say that the conflict should "be
^7

thought of as a natural rectification of Soviet borders, '
At this point in the conflicts the Reich could look upon the
winter war as an advantage to its overall military strategy.
If' the war were a prolonged one, it would keep the Soviets
busy in the North while Germany strengthened its position in
the Balkans,

At the same 11x11.83 it would help to exhaust

Soviet military strength and make Russia more dependent on
Germany,

The German attitude toward the war would change

only after the Allies indicated that they desired to send
troops to Finland by way of Norway and Sweden,
As Finland's army held back the Soviet offenses, the
Finnish Government attempted to gain outside aid and seek a
negotiated peace,

The early Finnish victories were encour

aging, but the government realized that the army could not
survive a long war of attrition without help.

On December k,

Rudolph Holsti asked the League of Nations to condemn the
Russian Aggression and send aid to Finland,

The League did,

in its last official act, condemn the USSR, but this organ!2nation
.

was now so weak that the mandate received little
j, p

support,

Finland had also requested that Germany and

Sweden use their good offices, in order to approach the
Soviets for possible terms for a negotiated settlement.

Nazi-Soviet Relations, 12?.
^Tanner,

106-108.

vb
Germany replied with its now characteristic no, and the
Soviet Union still continued to assert that it would not
L\C'

negotiate with a government it no longer recognized. *

Virtually every nation in the world, with the notable
exception of Germany, voiced-its support of the Finnish
cause *• As this sympathy began to turn into support in the
form of men and materiel, the Reich was forced to begin to
revaluate its attitude*

Hitler believed that the Scandi

navian countries should be kept out of the war until the
campaign in the West had been completed*

If France ana

Great Britain were defeated, there would then be no need to
extend the war into the North*

How, with volunteers crossing

Norway and Sweden to Finland, the war could spread to the
North before the Fuehrer was ready for it.5°.
Aid from nations which were as yet neutral in the war
did make its-way to Finland.

By the end of the war, over
<1
12,000 men had gone to Finland.-’- Even Italy, Germany’s
_

—

closest ally, did its best to send support.

Some of this

Italian aid did gain transit through Germany and caused the
Soviet Union to question German neutrality*
On .December 9, von Sehulenburg cabled his Foreign Office

49DGFP, VIII, 'k86-k%8i and Tanner, 106-108..
5®Earl F, Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Opera'
tions, 19^-0-19^5 (Washington, D.C. s Department of the Army
Parnphle t , ”1959)» 7-10 *
^j
M a r i n e rhe im, 359®

to' report that Molotov was furious over reports that Italy
had sent fifty pursuit planes to Finland by German r a i l .^2
Ribbentrop explained the matter by saying that Italy had
received the transit rights before the Winter War had begun
and that consent for the shipment had been withdrawn as soon
as the war started.

Some of the planes may have gotten

through, but there was no cause for alarm.$3

Tass did con

tinue to -publish reports of German arms shipments, but
Molotov ended this dispute, but not his suspicions, when he
•informed Ambassador Schulenburg that the matter had.been
explained to his satisfaction."' ' Italy was able to supply
Finland-with thirty fighter planes during the Winter War,
but they were sent through Norway and Sweden.-^
Germany did seem to be sincere in its- attempt to remain
neutral.

Admiral Raeder recommended that no arms be sent to

Finland, and Germany, was even hesitant to fulfill its arms
commitments to Sweden lest these guns find their way to the
Finns ,-5°

The number of unarmed volunteers which had begun to

pass through Norway and Sweden did not unduly alarm the

52dgpp$ viii,

506-50?*

53lbid,t 506-509, 514, 521*
^4 Ibid;, 513-514? and Nazi-Soviet Relat1ons, 130*
-^Mannerheim, 37?,
^^Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German
Navy {Washington, D «C .; U.S. Government Printing.Office, 194?),
35. Hereafter cited as Fuehrer Conferences. PGP?, VIII, 520.
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Germans*,

As early as December 6, Reichsmarshal Goering .told

Count Rosen, the Swedish Ambassador to Berlin, that Germany
would not object to Swedish volunteers going to Finland, nor
would it consider the passage of volunteers from neutral
countries as a casus belli ^

The possibility of an Allied

intervention through Scandinavia was an entirely different
matter,

Germany indicated in a vague manner that the Reich

was not interested in seeing Sweden commit itself in the
Winter War past the limits which had been prescribed by
Goering„
For the Allies, the early months of World War.II had
produced nothing but exasperation and frustration.

They had

not been able to stop the Wehrmacht from, conquering Poland,
and now that the German army was assembling its might on the
French borders, they had no cause for any optimism.

At the

time, it seemed impossible for the French and British to
launch an offensive against Germany, so they were forced to
wait and try to prepare for the next German move in the -West.
The Winter War began to focus their attention to the North,
If a front in Sca.ndina.via could be opened with support' from
Norway and Sweden, the whole complexion of the war might be
changed.
On December 11, ‘
Winston Churchill, who had already pro
posed plans to mine Norwegian territorial waters and the

^Tanner, 160 „
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Rhine River, brought up the possibility of extending the war
to the Worths

The proposal was considered in the Foreign

Office, and it was decided that the venture would be too
risky.

The plan might draw Russia into the war on Germany’s

side, and there was no assurance that the Norwegians and
Swedes would assist the plan.-^
At a meeting of the Allied Supreme War Council, French
Premier Daladier announced that Prance was most anxious to
aid Finland. y

The French were by now- frenetic in their

desire to see the war removed from their borders.

Members

of the French political right and left were sympathetic toFinland9s cause,

The French animosity toward .Russia was

high, because it was felt that the Soviet Union had betrayed
France by signing the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany after
iv had signed a similar agreement with France. u

The French

hoped to parlay the Scandinavian sympathy for Finland into a
durable coalition which would allow the war to be shifted
from the West to the North.

France realized the strategic

importance of the Swedish iron ore, but it was mainly

C^

-J>°Sir Llewellyn 'Woodward, British Foreign Policy In the
Second World War (Londons Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,

1962“), 19 .
59

_

Paul Keynaud, m The Thick Of' The Fight, -trans. by
James D. Lambert (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955)* 254-.
k^Pertihax /Share- Geraud7« The Gravediggers of France ■
(New York; Doubleday, Doran, and Co., 1944), 14-1.
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6l
interested in relieving some of the pressures at home»
The War Council decided to implement its new plans.by
sending a demarche to Norway and Sweden in order to gain
transit rights for an Allied passage through Scandinavia,
The Allies hoped to land at Narvik and Lulea, the Norwegian
ports from which Germany received most of its iron ore, and
then advance on to Finland after they had secured the iron
6?
fields in northern Sweden# ~
The control of the Norwegian coast was starting to .become
a top priority for the British.

Up to this time, Britain'

had not been able to halt the German shipments of Swedish
ore which were coming

fro m

ports in 'western Norway,

The Ger

mans .freighted their shipments through the Norwegian Leeds,
and their •ships 'stayed well within the fjord--protected terri
torial waters of Norway.°-5

Britain was equally sympathetic

with Finland, but it looked upon the proposed intervention
in the Winter War primarily as a chance to curtail Germany's
iron ore shipments.

Churchill, then Britain's First Lord of

the British Admiralty, was his country's chief proponent-.of
extending the war to the North.

He was willing to risk war

with the Soviet Union, because he felt that Russia was /

^Pertinax /Andre Glraud/, The Gravediggers of .France
(New York: Double day-, Doran, and Co,, 1944)., 142-144."'
°~¥. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol, I
(London; His Majesty8s Stationery Office, 1952), 45.
A^
-'Captain Donald MacIntyre, Narvik (New York; ¥. W.-'
Morton and Co,-, 1959), 55.
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already a German ally in everything but name6
The subject of the Swedish ore became even more impor
tant when It was learned from Fritz Thyssen, a former German'
industrialist then residing in France, that he believed that’
the war would be won by the side that could control the .
ore,,65
^

The Allies then looked upon aid to Finland as a

secondary effort to be completed when the primary targets in
Norway and Sweden had been secured*

The most immediate

disadvantage to the Allied plans in Scandinavia was the fact
that transit rights across Norway and Sweden would be hard
to obtain..

These two countries wished to remain neutral,

and they realized that the granting of passage rights -would
be a casus belli for Germany.

Anti-German.sentiment was high

in Norway and Sweden, but their desire to remain neutral
seemed even greater.
The war In Finland was now temporarily removed from the
spotlight.

However, since the Allies were counting on a

continuation of this struggle to give them an excuse to
invade Scandinavia, the Winter War was still of considerable
international importance.

If Finland weakened and the Soviet•

Union threatened to establish itself on the borders of Norway
and -Sweden, the Scandinavian governments might be willing to

6h
•'Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering; Storm (Bostons
Houghton Mifflin and Co,, 195-8), 551*
6<
-'Sir b'dward Spears, Assignment to Catastrophe, Vol. I
(New Yorks A, A. Wynn, Inc,, 1955), "ST.
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If the war ended by negotia

grant transit to the Allies,

tion, the British and French would have to drop their guise
of aiding the Finns and launch a direct attack on a Scandinavia which might offer resistance to their efforts, 66
u
Finland now began to drop subtle hints to Ambassador
Bluecher that it would be forced to request Allied aid if
A7
Germany did not help ir to find a negotiated peace, (
Bluecher disobeyed prior instructions to remain aloof from
the subject of a negotiated settlement and began to encourage
the German Foreign Office to use its Influence at the Kremlin
to bring an end to the war,

Eis reports to Berlin painted a

picture of despair in Finland.

He said that a total Soviet

victory would-completely halt the already interrupted ship
ments of Finnish nickel, copper, and molybdenum} restrict
traffic In the Baltics and spread Russian influence into
northern Sweden.

CO

Bluecher was persistent In his efforts

.to get the -Foreign Office to intervene, but he received only
rebuke for his suggestions,

Ribbentrop, In a tersely-worded

cable, told him to; "Please refrain from any expression of
'
6o
sympathy for the Finnish position," '
The activities of the Soviet navy In the Baltic had

66

Ziemke=, 23
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caused some concern to the Reich, but even here the Germans
continued their policy of cooperation with the Soviet union,
Russia -was attempting to blockade the Gulf of Bothnia, in
order to try to stop the passage of supplies from Sweden to
Finland.

The Kremlin requested that Germany aid its efforts

by allowing German steamers to resupply Soviet submarines.

*70

Admirals Raeder and. Fricke gave their consent to the plan
because they believed that it would not restrict German
movement in that area and the favor might be used to extract
71
future aid from the Soviet Union.•
Even though Germany had not yet chosen to become actively
involved in the North, it was now forced to evaluate the four
different courses of action which were developing in that
area.,

These four courses were developing separately of each

other, but they all seemed to be shaped b y 'the events of the
Winter War,
The first line of action was being.determined by the
Soviet Union.

As long as the Russians persisted in their

refusal to negotiate •an end to the 'Winter War, the Allies
could continue to plan their expedition through Scandinavia
'to relieve the Finns• As the war continued, the Scandina
vians * anti-Soviet sentiment would increase, and this in turn
would make them more amenable to cooperate with the Allies on

70dgpp, viii, 507.
71Ibid., 511-512
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the question of transit rights.

Secondly, the Finnish

Government, although it was anxious to end the war, was
considering the offer of Allied aid.

It had not as yet'

given the Allies a formal request for help, but if the Soviet'
Union seemed bent on a total victory, it would have no choice
in the matter._ The third course of action that the Reich
had to consider was whether Scandinavia would continue' to
remain neutral.

If the anti-German and anti-Soviet spirit

began to outweigh the sentiment for neutrality, the Reich
would have to consider intervention.

The fourth threat in

the Northern scheme was being shaped-in Britain and France,
France was very anxious to begin operations In the North,
but Britain was reluctant to attempt a campaign there unless
•transit rights were received.

Britain claimed 'that it was

■trying to protect the rights of democratic nations In Europe,;
and it believed that an attack on two neutral nations would
tarnish Its image as the protector of the smaller nations.
This, then, was the situation In the North in December of
1939»

The Winter War had not caused all' of these new develop

ments by itself, but’it was a primary contributing factor to
them.
Paralleling the Allied scheme of Intervention were the
German plans to counter any possible threat in the North,
Late in Decembers the German Naval Attache"" in Stockholm had
told the Swedish Government that It should remain "benevolently

5?
neutral" towards Finland.

r/0

The unqualified suggestion of

benevolent neutrality did give the Swedish Government con
siderable latitude in its attempt to aid. Finland with
volunteers and war materiel? however, the Swedes delivered
the aid with considerable caution,,

The aims which were sent

were made to appear as though they had been purchased by
Finland, and all volunteers were forced to travel across
Sweden unarmed and in civilian c l o t h e s O n January 2,
Prince zu Wied, the German representative to Stockholm, told
Foreign Minister Gunter that Germany was studying the effect
that Western assistance to Finland would have on Sweden's
neutrality»

The Swedish minister to Berlin was also informed

on January 4 that cooperation with the Western powers in
their attempt to aid Finland, " .., would not be consistent
'/A
with Swedish neutrality."' ' Norwegian Foreign Minister
Halvdan Koht said that he believed Norwegian assistance to
the Allied plan would cause a German attack on Norway.^
The German diplomatic line being employed in early
January put pressure on Norway and Sweden, but it did not
contain any explicit threats.

79

At first, no concrete
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limitations were placed on the Scandinavian aid to Finland,
but Sweden and Norway were given tacit reminders that Allied
intervention would be a casus belli»

Major-General von

Uthman, the German Military Attache*to Sweden, told the
Swedish cabinet that his Foreign Office was becoming "deeply
concerned" with the segment of public opinion that called for

?6
active intervention in the Winter War,'

in the face of the

German concern, Sweden decided that it would not honor the
Allied request for transit rights which had been made on
December 19, 1939®

On January 4,•Sweden informed Great Bri

tain that it would not allow a free passage to Finland ?
Norway issued a similar statement on January 15® ^
Behind this diplomatic pressure lay German military
plans to end. any possible threat in the North*

In early•

December Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the Norwegian National
Union Party and a Nazi sympathizer, made one of his periodic''
trips to Berlin for a conference with Hitler*

While there,

he spoke of the pro-British influence in the Norwegian
government and intimated that a secret treaty which would
allow the Allies to occupy Norway if the country were threat
ened by Germany existed ^

Ets comments accented the sup

positions which had a,lready been made by Admiral Baederi

^°Lundin,
77 Ibid»
no
OP
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^

59
If Germany continued its plans in the V/est, Britain might
well launch a surprise attack on the North.

Hitler did not

want to divert his attention from the West, but he did allow
the OKviPto begin a s t u d y for an invasion of Norway.

The OXW

plans became known as Studie IMord, and they grew from Hitler*!
original limited objectives of controlling key ports in
western Norway to the total occupation of both Norway and
Denmark.

80

On January 10, Hitler released' Studie Nord to the

service high commands for further study.

P

During January, the Finnish army continued to hold its
own against the Russians*

All fronts remained stable, s/nd

the military situation was not yet critical.

However well

the war might have been going at that time, Finland still
realized the inevitable conclusion of a protracted struggle.
Finland, then, continued to look for a country which would
mediate a peaceful end to the war, and It looked upon Sweden
and Germany as the countries that it would like to have act
as intercessors.

On January *5, Foreign Minister Tanner

called Bluecher to his office and asked him i f 'Germany could
now try to act as a mediator In the war.

Bluecher felt that

^ T h e 0K¥ (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) was the German
Armed'Forces High Command.
Qf)
Franz Haider, The Private Uar Journal of Generaloberst
Franz Haider, 15- August 1939 to 2k- September 199-2 (mimeo
graphed), III, 5, 3« Hereafter cited as Haider Diaries.
P1
21 emits, 12.
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this was a bad time to try to begin the negotiations.

The

Soviet Union had not yet won a significant victory in the
war, and he believed that Russia would not come to the conference table until it had begun to win the war,

8?

Weizsaeclcer informed Ambassador Bluecher on January 17 that
Bibbentrop wanted him to tell Tanner that there was no hope
that Germany could help to end the war ,83
During the last half of January, Germany began to alter
its diplomatic course slightly.

The weather had indefinitely

postponed any offensive in the'West, and Studie Nord had been
P,Ll

■recalled for additional planning„

Admiral B&eder did not

believe that a British invasion of Norway was immiment, and.
P£

he called for a continuation of the status quo in the North.-'
^

Whether the military strategy in Studie Nord had any material
effect on Germany's diplomatic line on the Winter war is
difficult to assess.

Admiral Raeder did believe that the

war was causing popular opinion in Norway and Sweden to
continue its call for active intervention.

The Admiral also

realized that the British would meet only-a token amount of
resistance■to an attack if the current pro-Finnish attitude
Q^
were to continue in Norway, ° It is entirely possible that

82Tanner, 117-118,
83pGFP, VIII, 677.
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Germany hoped to relieve some of the tension in the North
by. offering Finland at least the hope of a peaceful solution,.
On January 2k, Tanner intercepted a phone call made by
Bluecher to the German Foreign Office,

During the course of

the conversation, Bluecher was' told, to say that German
mediation might be considered.0 '

Even oefore the Finns could

begin to take advantage of this new development, Germany
begem to contact the Soviet Union on its own.

Von Tippleskirch,

the Secretary to the German Embassy in Moscow, had made an
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the Winter
He saw the disadvantages asi

War,

(1) the rise of anti-

German sentiment in the North, (2) the loss in trade with
Finland and Russia, and (3) the danger of Britain and France
trying to intervenes

On the side of the advantages werej

(1) the postponement of Hus Siam designs on Bessarabia,, (2)
the easing of Soviet tensions with Japan, and (3) the growing
Qp
dependence of the USSR on Germany,0
The day after this
assessment was made, Ambassador Schulenburg called on
Molotov,

Schulenburg asked Molotov•how long he thought the

Winter War would last.

He also pointed out that the war was

hurting Russo-German trade relations, as the Soviet Union was
finding it increasingly difficult to fill its trade commit
ments,

Molotov replied that German?/ would simply have to

8^Tanner, 122;
88dgpp» viii, 706-707.

oz
accept the trade difficulties.

He continued by saying that

■the Soviet Union still refused to negotiate with the
Byti-Tanner Government., and to the question as to whether he
would confer‘with Pehr .Svinhufvud should he be elected
President of Finland, Molotov said, "Maybe,
Molotov’s "maybe" was deceptive in that the Soviet Union
had already been contacted by its Ambassador to Sweden,
Madame Kollontai, on the possibility of beginning negotiations
with Finland.

On January 29, the Swedish Foreign Office

received a communique from the Soviet Union which said that
it did not regard a settlement with the Byti-Tanner Govern
ment , " „»» as being in principle unattainable.*' However,
before any talks could begin, the Soviet Union would have to
know in advance what concessions Finland would be willing to
make.9°

The Finnish reply, which was made on February 2,

said that Finland was willing'to resume the negotiations
which had been suspended, in November,

It was willing to cede

land on the Karelian Isthmus and neutralize the Gulf of
Finland under an international convention, but it 'was not
O'i
‘willing to cede territory that would endanger its security.^"
On February 5» the Soviet Union informed Finland through the
Swedish Foreign Office that it could not accept these terms

89DGFPt VIII, 708-709.
^ ^Tanner, 12 3 *
9xrbid,, 142-149; and Mannerheirn, 379,
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as a basis ror negotiation,"
On the same day that the Soviet Union informed Finland
that it was not yet ready to negotiate, the Supreme Allied
War'Council was considering once again an attack on Norway
which would precede an attempt to relieve Finland.

Britain

had come to begin a more serious consideration of an attack
on N a r v i k , a n d the French seemed to b e ,ready to send aid
to Finland as soon as possible®

Paul Reynard, who was

shortly to become Premier of Prance, reported that the council
had decided to send thirty thousand men to Narvik.

He also

stated:
When this body had been raised, the Allies
after having persuaded Finland to call them
to her aid, would use this appeal to ask
Norway and Sweden to permit the passage of
the troops. If this were rejected, -'There
would be grounds ,8 Dal&dier stressed, 'for
ignoring the refusal apd carrying out the
■ope ration aespi te it* *'^L''
Winston Churchill was still the chief British proponent
of active intervention.

He said, '"Small nations must not

tie our hands when wo are fighting for their rights and .
freedoms*"95

The-expeditionary force to be sent was to be

under British command, but no definite date was set for its

9%2annerheim, 380-381 *
9
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departure«

The Allies still seemed unsure of the resistance

that they might meet in Scandinavia, and they continued to
ofi
seek Finland3s call for assistance.
As a coincidence, it was also on February 5 that the
German plans for an invasion of the North began to take
their final form.

Studie Nord had been examined while Hitler

had postponed the attack on France until March.

The pro

posed invasion of Norway had now' received the operational
code name of ’
Ness erne bung, and Captain Theodor Xrancke, the
Commanding Officer of the cruiser Scheer, was made the senior
officer for the staff that would continue to modify the plans,
The subsequent Krancke Plans envisioned the occupation of
six strategic coastal areas: the Oslo Fjord, Sta.vanger,
Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik, and Tromso.

Air bases in northern

Denmark were to be used in the operation, ana, in order to
lessen the Norwegian resistance, the Government was to be
told that the occupation would terminate as soon as the war
had ended.
Operation Me s serue bung was as yet only a tactical
exercise.

Hitler had not decided to implement the plan yet,

but he became more and more concerned with the Allied pres
sure on Norway in February.
The vulnerability of the German position in the North

^ hanne m e lia, 3o±„
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Sea was demonstrated on February lo«

On that'day, six

British destroyers halted the German tanker Altmark in Nor
wegian territorial waters and removed three-hundred captured
Of
“1
British seamen,‘/U The seizure of the prisoners Illustrated
the’ tenuous safety of the Norwegian Leeds, and further seemed
to indicate the assistance that Norway might give to Britain.
Two Norwegian torpedo boats had been accompanying the
Altmark, but they refused, to try to repel the British cruisers
Once Operation wesssrnebung began to take form, the
Germans decided that there was less need for them to try to
start negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union,
Still, the German Foreign Office displayed a quiet concern
that the talks begin as soon as possible.

On February 13,

Bluecher received a cable from Ribbentrop which stated that
Germany did not want to act as a mediator yet, but he could
not predict how that decision would change In the next few
weeks.

He did give Bluecher permission to try to find out

what Finlandfs terms for a negotiated settlement would be,
and he was also to attempt to arrange for Berlin to be used
as a -possible site for talks.^

On February 17, Bluecher

did approach Tanner to suggest Berlin as a site for future
negotiations with the Soviet Union,

He was careful to say

that the idea was his own so that Tanner would not think

OQ
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that the German Foreign Office had altered its neutral
position* 1oo

Tanner anc. Bluecher conversed again on

February 209 and the Finnish Foreign Minister refused to tell
the Ambassador if Finland were negotiating for Allied aid.lwl
Bluecher had become either quite alarmed with the situation
or else he 'was trying to frighten his Foreign Office into
trying to open talks with Russia when he filed a report on
the situation in Finland on February 22*

In the situation

paper, he stressed that the Soviet penetration of the Mannerhelm Line- had made the Finnish Government much more anxious
to receive outside aid*

Bluecher felt that it would be best

for Germany to try to end the winter War before the Allies
.
- an opportunity
. .x. to
. intervene*
• •
102
naci
The subtly-phrased German overtures were not enough'for
the Finns*

The Finnish Foreign Office was now weighing the

Allied offer of assistance against the progress of the ,
Swedish attempt to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union.
The German attitude toward the Finnish dilemma had changed,
but it had not changed, sufficiently to guarantee that It
would or even could bring an end to the hostilities*
Marshal Mannerheim, the Finnish Commander-in-chief, felt
that his army was holding out as well as could be expected*

1qoDGPP8 VIII, 7?8-779*
^ ^ Told*, 785-786; and. Tanner, I66-I67.
i02DGFP, VIII, 802-80V*

6?
but he was In favor of trying to negotiate a peace,

he felt
in o
that Allied, aid should be requested only as a last resort.

On February 20* M&nnerheim received British General Ling and
Colonel Ganeval of the. French Army.

These officers had been

sent to Helsinki to help clarify the Allied plans.

They

explained that an attack on Norway had been planned, but they
expected that a German counterattack would perhaps prevent
any assistance from reaching Finland *

Ganeval also told

Tanner that the Allies were to attempt a passage across
Scandinavia with or without transit rights, and the Swedish
iron fields would have to be secured before any of the expe
ditionary force could be sent to Finland,

Tanner*s evaluation

of this information caused him to say, "On this basis Finland
_L0 ^ assumed a pretty dubious a t t i t u d
e H e

realised that

Finland was being used as an excuse to help the Allies secure
more important military targets.

A Finnish request for the

Allied aid began to center on three as yet unanswered ques
tions; (1) How many volunteers would there be? (2) Would
Norway and Sweden grant the transit rights? and (3) Would
the assistance arrive in time to be'of any help? j06
The Soviet Union furthered the possibility of negotiations

Tanner, 152-153 *
“^‘Hlannerheim, 381 =
10^Tanner, 170-171.
1nb

"
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yihen It forwarded. Its minimal demands to the Swedish Porelg
Office on February 24.

In order for negotiations to be

successful, Finland would have to be willing to cede Eanko,
the entire Karelian Isthmus, and the northeastern shore of
107
Lake Ladoga,~ ‘ Tanner left for Stockholm to meet with
Madame Kollontai on February 26.

As soon as he arrived, he

spoke to Finland8s ambassador to Sweden.

He. told Kivlmaki

that the Germans had advised him to make peace even If the
terms were unfavorable.

He believed that Germany had made

an attempt to act as mediator, but Russia had turned the
iAO
proposal down®
On February'28, the Finnish Diet announc
that It would consider the Soviet demands as a point of
departure for the talks *-^9
As soon as Finland decided to negotiate, the Allies
began, to press the question of intervention.

On March I, t

British Ambassador to Finland, Gordon Vereker, told Tanner,
"If the Scandinavian countries do not permit the Western
forces to pass through their territories so much the worse
^ /'s

for them."

To amplify the confusion that surrounded

Allied intentions, Tanner noted that Vereker informed him
two days later that he did not know what the Allies would

.

1 07(
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1i*1
do If transit rights were not given.Xxx

_
it did seem that

Prance was most anxious to see the plans begin.

Without -.

consulting Britain, Premier Daladier, on March 2, promised
to send forty to fifty thousand men to Finland.

When

Churchill heard of this offer he felt that it was foolish
in view of the Impending German attack on France and Belgiura.

112

The possibility of Allied aid actually arriving was

lessened when Tanner received word from Sweden that it would
attempt to stop troop passage by force if Germany requested
them to do so.1^
Upon the advice of Marshal Mamie rheim that the army
could not hope to hold out much longer, the Finnish Govern
ment decided to negotiate and not request Allied aid,1^
On March 6, Molotov said that an armistice could begin if
the’city of Vlipuri and Viipuri Bay were evacuated.

These

conditions were reluctantly met, and the talks began at the
Kremlin on March
Even at'this late date, the Allies continued to press
the Finns to accept their offer of assistance.

On March 9,

the Finnish Ministers in Paris and London were told that, if

xx"Tanner, 205•

112Churchills 573=
1^^Tanner, 210.
1ilx
■ x" '‘Mamierheim, 387.
xi^Tanner, •213.
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Finland would issue a call for help, the Allies would come
to their aid with all possible speed.

They promised to

deliver one-hundred bombers in two weeks, but the dispatch
of the troops was still dependent upon the attitude of
i-iA
Norway and Sweden on transit rights 0-LJ-u Because of the
uncertainty of the situation, Marshal Mannerheim gave his
categorical opinion that the Soviet terms should be accepted.
On March 12, just hours before the Busso-Finnish peace talks
reached their conclusion, Allied troops boarded British ships
for a "peaceful" invasion of Norway.

A landing was to be

made at Narvik to test the degree of Norwegian resistance,
and then, If the troops found the Norwegians to be coopera
tive, the rest of the force was to land at Bergen and Stavinger.

After the Finns signed the peace treaty In Moscow,

the two divisions were diverted to Prance and the Invasion
was cance1led;11?
Hitier5s attitude toward Finland had remained completely
unchanged during the course of the developments in February
and early March.

The Fuehrer realized that the Winter War

had caused the focal point of the war to shift to the North,
but he also realized that he could-gain security in Scandi
navia without Intervening In Finland and thereby causing a
diplomatic breach with the Soviet union.

^^^Mannerheim, 388,
li7Churchill, 573.

On March, b, in,a
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second conversation with Sven Hedin, Hitler said that Ger
many’s sympathy remained with Russia.

He added that he

would intervene in the North only if the Allies tried to
IiD
cross Norway and S w e d e n . —
In a letter to Mussolini on
March 8, Hitler again declared that "Germany had no parti11 Q
cular obligations toward Finland." 7
Hitler could well afford to ignore Finland In view of
the fact that Norway and.Sweden were continuing to refuse
transit rights to the Allies and his own plans for invading
the North were progressing rapidly.

On February 21, General

Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, who had led the German expedition
to Finland in 1918, was given the command of Operation
Nesseruebung.

'Hitler, on March. 1, then issued his "Directive

for Case Ivesse ruebnngi; and established the primary object Ives
of the invasion.

The strategic objectives were to forstall

an Allied invasion of Norway and to provide security for the
Swedish iron fields.'"120

Admiral Baeder believed that a

prompt execution of the plan was Imperative in order to pre
vent the Allied Invasion under the pretext of sending aid to
Finland*
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When.Allied submarines were spotted off the

Skagerrak on the 13th, an immediate implementation of

•L~°DG?1F , •VIII, 862-864.
^-^Ibld., 87?o
■^^Ziemke, 18-19*
"^“Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, 20.

Operation Wesseruebung was readied; but when the Eusso-Finni
Peace Treaty went into effect and the submarines withdrew
on the 15th, Hitler felt that the' invasion of Norway could
1op
then proceed "without excessive haste F'
The peace treaty that Finland signed on the evening of
the 12th was harsh,

Finland was forced to cede all of the

Karelian Isthmus,' lease Hanko, build a railroad to connect
northern Finland to Soviet Karelia, and proraise not to make
any alliances which would be directed against the Soviet
Union.

12 2
J

Finland’s line of defense was .now impaired, .its,

economy in ruins, and its Isolation conrolete.

Russia had

not achieved the total victory that It desired, but it had
made Inroads which could be used to pressure Finland into ,
cooperating with the Soviet Union In the future.
In an Itemized account of his estimation of the future
effects of the Russo-Finnish Treaty. Bluecher predicted that
(1) Russia would now control the Gulf of Finland and the"
central portion of the Baltic, (2) Finland would no longer
be'able to ally Itself with Scandinavia, and (3) future
tensions in the Baltic had to be anticipated,

124

The Winter War had given Germany serious problems to

12?
"'Ziemke, 20.
" h o r the complete text of the Russo-Finnish Peace
Treaty see Soviet Documents, III, 421-423.

contend with.

The invasion of France had to be postponed,

its supply of iron ore had been threatened, and an ultimate
invasion of Norway had to be contemplated and prepared for.
Throughout this period of crisis, the Reich continued to
honor its prior commitments to the Soviet Union.

The rela

tionship between Germany and Russia had not been a cordial
one, but the Reich did allow the Soviet Union to attempt -to
spread its sphere of influence northward into Finland.

To

German;/, Finland was still just the price that it had to pay
for Soviet cooperation while it continued its campaign in
the West*

CHAPTER III
THE INTERIM
After the signing of the Russo “-Finnish Peace Treaty*,
the German OKW theorised that* since the Allies had now lost
their pretext for invading Norway, the immediate pressure to
act in the North was relieved and Operation Wesseruebung was
temporarily cancelled,.

Hitler, however, was not deluded into

believing that Britain had given up all hope of stopping
Germany's supply of iron ore.

As long as Great Britain

maintained its naval superiority in the North Sea, it could
decide to defend the Norwegian Leeds and accomplish its
strategic objectives without invading the mainland.

Prompted

by Admiral Raeder to face the problem, which seemingly could
only be overcome by an invasion of Norway, Hitler announced
that April 9 would be "Messer Day,"1
On ■the morning of April 9, the German Blitzkreig began
to move through Denmark and Norway.

The campaign to conquer

Norway proved to be more difficult than had been expected.
The German navy lost the heavy cruiser Blueoher, and the
Scharnhorst ana the Enelsenau were badly damaged.

The army

met stiff resistance from the Allies in and around Narvik,

^Ziemkes 19-22,
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but Norway was taken with a loss of only 1,31? killed, a
small number for such an Important victory.

By June 3, the

Allies had evacuated their forces from Norway, ana on June 9
the Norwegian army, surrendered.

By this victory, Hitler had

made himself the undisputed master of the Baltic Sea and
Scandinavia,^
The Winter War had left Finland independent but very
close to the brink of economic, military, and political ■
disaster.

Now that trade with Great Britain had been all but

stopped,-5 Finland had to begin to- find new markets.

Even if

Finland could find other markets, it was doubtful that the
nation could redevelop its productive capacity for a number
of years.

The areas in the south which had been ceded .to.

Russia contained most of Finland's limited industry, and
what plants that had not been confiscated by the Soviet Union
were destroyed in the war.

The Soviet acquisition of Salla

and the area surrounding it gave the Russians a salient from
which to launch an attack into central Finland.

The Manner-

heim Line had been lost with the cession of the Karelian
'Isthmus, ana the, Soviet troops In Hanko threatened Finland."s
western coast.

In the north, the Russians had acquired the

western half of the Rybaehiy Peninsula,

Prom this vantage

^Zlemke, 109-112
^In the pre-war years, Great Britain had been receiving
over fifty per cent of Finland’s exports.
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point, they could threaten Finland’s only port in the' north
and possibly control the rich nickel fields of Petsamo to
the south#

If the Soviets decided to resume the war, it

could develop a series of irresistible pincer movements
which would fragment and. conquer Finland»

In June, when

Norway and France were going down to defeat, Finland was
\

isolated, from the best.

The conquest of Norway blocked the

path of any new Allied support.

The defeat of Norway also

isolated Sweden, making- it impossible for a Finno-Swedish
alliance because of Sweden's new dependence on Germany.

The

fall of Prance eliminated the Allied presence on the Conti
nent, and allowed Hitler to strengthen his gains and prepare
for new ones,

With Germany and the Soviet Union as the two

remaining Continental powers, Finland’s destiny now lay in
h
their hands.' A distinct political triangle was now being
formed In reference to Finland.

Germany would begin to be

come more Interested in Finland, and the Soviet Union would
increase its everpresent interest ,1 Finland,- caught at the
apes of the triangle, would be forced to look to both the
East and the West as it became the subject of the conflicting
German and Hussian strategies.
It is not entirely clear why the Soviet Union chose to
halt the Winter War when it did.

The threat of Allied Inter

vention, the growing Nazi influence in southern Europe, and

Li,
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the toll of men and material enacted by the fierce Finnish
resistance, all played, a part in bringing an early end to
the struggle.

¥hat is certain is the fact that the Soviet

’union continued to,fear and distrust the Nazis, and it was
not at all pleased by the rapid German victories in the Nest.
The Russians had. hoped that German.}/ would become involved in
a long war of attrition so that they could, solidify their
own gains in the Baltic.

Russia had halted its military•

advance into Finland, but it by no means intended to stop
political pressures.

Germany, on the other hand, was now

occupied with Operation'Sea Lion, the plan that it hoped would
materialize in the invasion and conquest of Great Britain.
Germany, as long as it was still tied down in the West,, .was
content to allow Russia to maintain its sphere of influence
in the Baltic.
The immediate Finnish reaction to the conquest of .Norwaywas mixed.

The Finns were sympathetic with Norway, but the

extension of the war to the North did not cause a wave of
anti-Nazi hysteria.

Finland was forced to evaluate the new

political realities of Europe,

The evaluation of the latest,

events produced the realization that Hitler was the master of
Europe .

It was then felt that Finland should begin to

implement a policy of Realpolitik in its future relations,
with the Reich.-'

•5Anthony F . Upton, Finland in Crisis, 1940-1941 (ithaca
Cornell University Press, I9 o 47~I 91-94,
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Germany"s first indication of its latent interest in
Finland came shortly after the winter War had ended,

The

-Reich"s Economic policy Department issued a memorandum on
March 28 which stated that an economic agreement should be
concluded with Finland " ,., to forestall, similar wishes on
s
the part of Russia and the'Western Powers,”D The report con■tinned with an assessment .of the possible bases of a future
trade relationship.

The level of Finland's pre-war produc

tion was severely reduceds but Germany hoped that the pro\

vm. . . t J__0

ieeded by the Reich would soon begin,

Finland's entire production of copper had been going to
Germany and the shipments were to be resumed as soon as
'transportation difficulties were cleared up.

Nickel was the

metal.most desired by the Germans, but the future shipments
•of this commodity was clouded by several political problems.
First of ally the mines in the Petsamo region were being
operated by a Canadian concessionaire, the bond Nickel Cor
poration, 'If the company continued its lease, it undoubtedly
would refuse to sell its ore to Germany,

Secondly, the Ger

man government had negotiated an agreement in October, 1939*
which proposed to send one-hundred and thirty-four anti
aircraft guns to Finland in exchange for a promise to increase
the production of copper and nickel,

Only fifty of the guns

had been sent to Finland before the outbreak of the Winter
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War, and it was. felt that the Finnish Government would press
for the delivery of the other eighty-three guns before a
new agreement on the nickel could be made.

This was thought

to be impossible because of the Russian objections that would
arise from a rearmament of Finland.

The most ominous threat

to successful trade in nickel was the fact that the Soviet
Union was beginning to show considerable interest in
obtaining the Pets&mo concession for itself.

Germany, if

Russia continued to press its claims on the area, would have
to choose between implementing its own economic interests in
the area and the continuation of friendly relations with the
USSR.

Still another difficulty in establishing economic

intercourse with Finland was the fact that the Finns would
want to export large quantities of wood products to Germany
in exchange for finished metal goods, a commodity the Reich
could not afford to export because of its own war needs.
Karl Schnurre>was sent to Helsinki on April 8 to act as a
.special plenipotentiary in negotiating a trade program,^
The German Foreign Office had already begun a discreet
appraisal of the Soviet attitude toward the Petsamo question
before it made any firm commitments with the Finns.

In the

course of a conversation on the Russo-Finnish Peace Treaty,
Ambassador Schulenburg inquired about the future fate of
Petsamo.

Molotov Informed him.that the Soviet Union had

?DGFPt IX, 32-35.
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allowed Finland to retain Petsamo on the condition that .no
military bases would be constructed there and.no Allied .war- .
P.

ships would be allowed to be stationed in the northern ports,■
The German plans to invade' Norway and Denmark would
naturally disturb the Soviet Union, and plans to begin even
the slightest influence in the eastern Baltic would cause a
major shift in the diplomatic climate between, the two coun
tries.

On April 7? Ribbentrop instructed von.Schulenburg to.

inform Molotov, once the invasion had begun, that "Sweden'and
Finland will in no way be affected by our plans."

He was

also to explain that the occupation of Norway would help the
USSR in that it would prevent any future reopening of the
Finnish question by the British and French.9

These assurances

were meant to allay any Soviet suspicions, but because the
northern borders of Norway overlapped those of Sweden and
extended to the very edge of Petsamo, the German army would
then be within a short distance of Murmansk and the Murmansk
Railroad.

With this in mind, the Soviet fears and feelings

of insecurity could not help but be increased by the inva
sion.

On April 11, after Schulenburg had completed his talks

with Molotov, he noted an "unfavorable shift" in Soviet atti
tude.

Molotov was worried that the war,would move to Sweden

and then to the eastern Baltic.

8DGFP, IX, ■ 37-^0,
9ibia;, 137-138.

A concrete example of the
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new Soviet attitude was displayed when Molotov announced
that Russia would not honor its promise to supply Germany
with the northern naval base it had promised earlier.

1n

The

Soviet Union obviously felt that German influence was
spreading rapidly enough by itself i\Tithout adding to it.
The April trade negotiations with Finland.
.produced no
firm results, but Germany did make it known that it was
interested in Petsamo,

Finland was reluctant to give broad

trade concessions to Germany at a time when Russia was
beginning to make its post-war claims on the country.

The

Soviet Union was particularly disturbed that Finland had
removed machinery from the areas that had been ceded by the
treaty.

Although there had been no clause in the treaty

which stated that the machinery was to be given to the
Soviets, they maintained that the transfer had been implied.
While Germany was still unwilling to give any protective
assurances to Finland, the Finns were reticent to cooperate
in areas that they knew would offend Russia.
to strengthen ties with Germany were made.

However, moves
One notable move

to establish a rapport with the Reich was the.appointment of
Professor T. M. Kivimaki as the new ambassador to Germany.
Kivimaki had held high government posts and his pro-German

10DGFP, IX,' 138-140.
^ F inland Reveals Her Secret Documents, (New York:
Wilfred Funis;, Inc., l^TTj 7~9»

11

82
ip

leaning was a recognized fact, ~
Trade talks with Finland resumed i n .early June.

At

this■session, Germany said that It wished to take over the-.
Petsamo concession In the near future.

The Finns were still

reluctant to go this far, but they did promise that Germany
would receive seventy-five per cent of the ore once produc
tion resumed.

Since the agreement could not -possibly go

Into effect at that time, It was not communicated to the
Soviet Union.^
On June 1^, the German army began to occupy Finnmark,
the northernmost province of Norway,

With troops stationed

at Kirken.es, the largest city in the province, the Nazis were
In a position to exert a military control over Petsamo if It
*1h
so desired„
It was by no coincidence then that on June 23
Molotov informed Finnish Ambassador Paasikivi that Russia
wanted to obtain the Petsamo nickel concession,

Paasikivi

told Molotov that such a plan was not possible since the
Mond Nickel Company already had the concession rights.^
Several days later, Molotov Informed paasikivi that his
government was not only interested in the Petsamo nickel,
but it was interested in the area itself.

He said that it

Upton, .100®
13Ibid., 106-10?»
1h
’Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 50-51'
■^Ibid®, 51 ,
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1f\
was necessary to eliminate British influence in the area.10
Great Britain did continue to carry on a very limited trade
with Finland through the ports in the north, but the Soviet
anxiety could only have been caused by the recent German
occupation of Finnmark.

If the Soviet Union could control

the narrow sleeve that separated Finnmark from Soviet Karelia,
it could observe the military build up in the .area.
The completion of the Finno-German contract on the
Petsamo nickel had to be delayed because of the new Soviet
demands.

The German Embassy had informed Molotov that the

Reich was interested in obtaining nickel from the area, but
it did not tell him that negotiations had begun,

Molotov

told Schulenburg that the Soviet Union was ready to guarantee
Germany fifty per cent of the Petsamo output and the German
request for.seventy-five per cent of the ore would receive
"sympathetic study,"

17

Germany pretended to negotiate with

Russia for a percentage of the nickel, but it was still felt
that a Soviet control of the area would severely complicate
the acquisition of the nickel.

The Soviet Union might be

willing to give Germany a majority of the ore, but constant
negotiations would be required to insure that the German
demands were met.

1

18

Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 51•
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On July 4, Bluecher reported from Helsinki that proGerman sentiment in Finland was growing in "avalanche
proportions."

He felt that efforts were being made to

establish a pro-German government, but he had cautioned
various Finnish leaders that the sentiment should not be.
developed too quickly or the Soviet Union would become sus-:
picious, IQ
'
The pro-German sentiment in Finland was a result 'of a':
renewed anti-Soviet hatred.

Finland’s post-war policy of

trying to cooperate with the Soviet Union had produced ■very
little results.

The USSB was looking for security, not

amiable r e l a t i o n s a n d to strengthen its position in the
North, Russia had to continue to make extensive demands on
Finland.

On July 9s the Finnish Foreign Ministry was in

formed that Article 4 of the peace treaty, which gave the
Soviets the lease on Hanko, would have to be supplemented
so that Soviet trains could run on Finnish rails to the port.20
■The Soviet Union’s pretext for the request was that it was
difficult to supply its station there by sea.

In reality

it wanted to establish a line of communication through
southern Finland which could be used in time of war.
Later In the month the Soviet Union did soften its
stand on the Petsamo question.

It Informed Finland that it

'■■ .19pGFP, IX, 121-122.
O
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would settle for an agreement which would give it forty per
cent of the nickel production for 19;40 if the remaining
oi
sixty per cent would go to Germany.‘T* This decision meant
that only the most immediate problem concerning the Petsamo
nickel had been temporarily settled.,

The dispute on conces

sion rights would continue for the next eleven months*
If there is a decisive turning point in Nazi Germany's
diplomatic attitude toward Finland, it would have to be
dated from July 22, 19^0.

On this day-, Hitler, in a meeting

with his General Staff, said that a -possible Invasion of
.Russia had to be planned and Finland was mentioned as a
gateway of attack* 22 . Up to this time, any German interest in
Finland had to be tempered by the conditions of the NaziSoviet Non-Aggression Pact,

Now, as the plans for the Inva

sion of Russia progressed, Germany could afford to discount
the effect that its influence In Finland would have on its
relations with the Soviet Union.

The Reich would now only

have to mask the inroads it was making into Finland so Russia
’would -not become unduly suspicious and begin to anticipate
the attack that was forthcoming.
The initial plans that were being developed were as yet
very nebulous and Intended as hypothetical preparations for
a possible course of action.

The preliminary plans were born

2^Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 5^> and DGFP.
IX, 185-1851
"
22Halder Diaries. IV, 128,
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of the frustration that accompanied the extended delay In
the proposed invasion of Great Britain,

The British Isles

had ’withstood the seige of Britain, and the British domina
tion of the sea plus its growing strength In the air prevented
Germany from gaining the necessary cover it needed to support
an amphibious landing,

Hitler believed that Britain8s will

to continue the war had been revived, and he attributed the
revival to that nation's growing hope of an alliance with
the Soviet Union.

General Franz Haider,, the Army's Chief of

Staff reported that the Fuehrer had said, "With Russia smashed,
Britain8s last hope will be shattered,

Russia's destruction

must be made a part of this struggle," 22
J

The attack was

tentatively scheduled for the spring of 1961.
From the beginning of August a gradual change In FinnoGerman relations was begun.

At first, the talks on Petsamo

continued to highlight the German interest in Finland, but
military involvement was soon begun.

The Petsamo negotiations

had worn themselves into a predictable routine.

The Soviet

Union continued to press for the concession, and Finland
continued to stall with a variety of excuses.

Germany

wished to keep the Soviet Union ignorant of its talks with
Finland and it wanted the Finns to negotiate with the
Russians In a "dilatory manner," but the Reich was still
unwilling to give anything but tacit moral support to aid

2^Haider Diaries, IV, l6l, 166,

8?
In the talks.
Bluecher, now that he saw a renewed German interest in
Finland, began once more to cable reports on the importance
of Finland to the war effort.

He said that the Petsamo con

cession would give Germany a twenty-year supply of' nickel,
and he was positive that the Finns were ready to sign a
favorable agreement with the Reich,

He also cautioned that

a Russian occupation of the Aaiand Islands -would, make
.•« Germany's military-political position in the North
Pii.
untenable. '
Finland had once again been trying; to interest
Sweden in a bilateral defense of the Aalands, and the Soviet
Union was opposing the plan,

Russia felt that Finland was

planning to turn whatever fortifications were built over to
Germany, and it felt that It should be able to take part in
any scheme to defend the Islands,
Ambassador Bluecher was no longer the only one to call
for an increased influence in Finland,

Marshal Keitel, the

Chief of Staff of the German -Armed Forces High Command, told
Weizsaecker that the OKU would regret a new Russo-Finnish war.
OKW„ in view of the new Soviet troop movement to and from
Hanko, felt that a word of restraint should be given to
Russia, reminding it of the German economic interests in
Finland,

Welzsaecker felt that the diplomatic situation

between Russia and Germany would not permit such a blunt

2^DGFP, x, ^05.

oO
q
u
proposal.

He believed that the only thing that could be

done at the time -would be to make a discreet inquiry to the
25
USSR to find, out if it., had any "new plans" for Finland,,
The first indication of Germany's military cooperation
with Finland came on August 12, when Hitler gave his permis
sion to allow a pre-Winter War arms contract between Denmark
and Finland to be completed.

When Denmark and Norway were

invaded, large shipments of arms which were intended for
delivery to Finland had been captured by the Nazis®

General

Keitel reported that Hitler was now beginning a program of
of
"indirect and inconspicuous encouragement of the Finns."^
Hitler had made inquiries about the strength of Finland's
army, and he felt that the country could not continue to
resist the Soviet pressures while it was in such a weakened
state.

If Germany gave Finland an indication of future sup

port,- Finland could be expected to resist the Russian attempts
27
to gain Petsamo®
The time was not yet ripe for a large scale German
intervention into Finland,

Hitler was still contemplating
28
the beginning of Opers.fion Sea Lion in August,
-and an overt

interest in Finland would still be uremature.' The Finns were

2%GFP, X, 460,
26Ibid., 467,
2^Haider Diaries, IV, 157
oq

Ibid., 159*
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anxious to receive any support that the Germans 'might offer.
On August 14, Ambassador Kivimaki asked if Germany would at
least give diplomatic support to Pinland in case of a new
Busso-FInnIsh war.

Kivimaki was undoubtedly looking for

more than diplomatic support, but, in any case, the German
po
Foreign Office refused, to give him an answer. ' Even silence
was encouraging to the Finns after nearly a year of negative
replies to the same query.
The German military was not following the Foreign Office's
30
line of cautious correctness.v

On August 17, a. Lieutenant-

Colonel Joseph Veltjens, acting as a special representative
of Reiehsmarshal Goering, met with Finland’s Marshal Kannerheiiu.

In their conversation, Veltjens said that Germany

would'be willing to supply Finland with certain war materials
in return for transit rights to northern Norway and an,option
on the Petsamo nickel concession,

Kannerheim said that he

could not make a decision on what he believed to be a poli
tical, rather’than a military matter, and he referred
Veltjens to President Ryti.

Ryti gave his assent to the plan,

as the presence of even a limited number of German troops
would help uo curb the omnipresent Soviet demands, 31

Ryti

29DGFP, X, 478-479.
70 The German Foreign Office was not informed of Veltjens
mission to Helsinki for several months,
31

Mannerheim, 399» Ryti later claimed that he had not
given Veltjens any approval of the plan, but he did say that
he was in favor of it.

90
announced on the same day, "We Finns are realists.

We have

tried to maintain good relations with Russia, and we hope
qp

that Russia has the same idea."-'-

This speech was intended

to assuage the Soviet doubts as to the course of Finlandrs
diplomacy, but the key word in the address was "realists."
If the Finns were indeed realists, they would soon choose to
cooperate with Germany rather than continue to try to appease
the Soviet Union.
The passage of the troops through Finland was to be
explained to the Soviet Union in cautious terms.

The route

to Kirkenes through Finland was shorter and more easily
travelled than any existing line of communication through
Norway.

The Soviets were to be told that the men who were

to pass through Finland were replacements.

It was obvious

that Germany intended to make more use of the transit rights
than this.

On August 22, Hitler decided to send two mountain;

divisions to Kirkenes via Finland, many more men than were'
actually needed to garrison the remote province.

On August 26,

the Fuehrer announced that Finland was to be su.pported by
German arms and planes.

More important yet, he said that

Germany would occupy Petsamo if liussia attacked Finland
again, 33
^

The arms shipments were to be disguised so Russia

would not know that they were German,

qq

As Hitler said, "It

-

-'"Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 58“60.
-^Haider Diaries, IV, 168, 174; and DGPP» X s 512,
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must be brought home to the Russians that the shipments now
being made to Finland are merely the last of the arms deli
veries held up by the viar."^
On August 14, Ribbentro'p quizzed the .Russian ambassador
to Berlin on the "stiffening" of Russo-Finnish relations’, ';
He said that he was curious to know if an understanding on.!
.
the fortification of the Aaland Islands had been made between:
Finland and Russia.

Germany had no intentions of trying to

participate as a defender of the islands, but it. let Russia
Know that it wanted to be part of any new convention that
O i*
might decide their fate
The final draft of the transit treaty was completed on
.September 12.

Four main points were covered In the treaty:

(1) Germany was allowed to transport troops from Finnish'
ports on the Baltic to Kirkenes by way of the northern
Arctic Highway,

(2) The Reich was to inform Finland of the

intended ports of debarkation, the number of vessels, dates
of arrival, and stages of transportation through the north,
(3) Finland was to be informed of the arrival.of troops at
least one day in advance, and (4) troops and ordnance were
to travel separately.-^

The spirit of the agreement can be

gauged by.the fact that OKW was confident that the Finns .

J^Haider Diaries1, IV, 1?9.
-^H a z i - S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s , 177»

-^DC-FP, XI, 148-149; bmd Mannerheim, 400,
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would ignore Article A,-7'
The troop movement was to be presented to the Soviet
Union as a fait acconrpll.

In advance' instructions to Ambas

sador Schulenburg, Ribbentrop wanted Molotov informed that'
the English air attacks on Germany necessitated the emplace
ment of an antiaircraft battalion in northern Norway? since
the best route lay through Finland, the troops would be
transported from H&paranda to Kirkenes -beginning September 22.
Molotov was to be told this information on September 21, but
°Q
Hitler later decided against informing the Russians at all,-'*'
The fact that the Russians were not told of the troop move
ments is indicative of the fact that Germany realized how
serious this new departure from the old Nazi-Soviet accord
really was•

Germany undoubtedly believed that there was a

good chance that Russia would try to stop .the transit.

On

September 23» the Finnish foreign minister did inform the
British and Soviet ambassadors of the troop movements.

The

Soviet ambassador was quite excited and asked if the Germans
had presented the Finns with an ultimatum on the matter.

He

was even more alarmed when he was told that they had not.
Molotov had no intention of receiving the explanation of

3?d g f p 8 x i , 149.
oQ
Ivazi-Soviet Relations „ 188-189* The troop movement was
to begin on the day that the treaty.x^as formally signed.-
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the troop movement at face value.

He demanded that

Schulenburg give him the text of the treaty, including any
secret portions that accompanied it.

He also wanted to be

informed in advance of the dates of departure and size of
any future troop movements,

40

Ribbentrop answered this

request for further information with a communique that simply
reiterated the text of the transit treaty which the Soviet
Union had already received from Finland.

Li 1

-

Molotov was not

at all pleased with the Beich's effusive answer.

He imme

diately informed Ribbentrop that the Non-Aggression Pact had
placed Finland within the Soviet sphere of influence and that
he considered the latest German move as a breach of the
ho
treaty.
Russia, attempted to meet the Nazi .threat by'
demanding that Finland grant'Russian representatives unre
stricted travel rights within their consular territories
If Russia could not stop the movements or gain' information on
them from Germany, it could assess the situation by itself.
By October 19, 4,800 men, 58? vehicles, and an antiiilj'aircraft battalion had been transported to Kirkenes.'
As
the German military presence in Finland began to increase,

^°DGFP, XI, 195-196; and Nazi-Soviet Relations, 197-199
^ I b i d , , 236-238? 201-203.
^2Ibid-., 244-245; .203-204.
ho
4P inland Reveals Her Secret Documents', 64.
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the Reich started to become more involved in the diplomatic
disputes between Finland and Russia on the Aaland and Petsamo
questions.

Previously,, only Sweden had been an interested

ally in the defense of the islands.
to involve Germany in the scheme.

Now, Finland was trying
Germany, however, was only

interested in trying to exclude the Soviet Union from, any
new defense plans.

To the German Foreign Office, only a-

unilateral Finnish fortification or a total demilitarization
of. the islands would serve as an acceptable solution to the
problem,

Finland continued to stall, on the Soviet request

to participate in the defense plans by saying that the 1921
Aaland Convention signators would have to give their approval
before any new plan would be legal,

Molotov appeared doubtful

of this explanation, and he sarcastically asked if Poland’s
approval was being sought.

His disgust at the constant

Finnish delays in the pending agreements prompted him to say:
"With the Germans one /meaning the Plnns7 can settle even
big matters in a few days."

!< <

■

When the Finns realized that

the Russians could be delayed no longer, they negotiated a
demilitarization agreement with them on October 11.

By this

agreement, Finland promised to demilitarize the islands and
not allow them to be placed at the disposal of any other
power.

The Soviet Union gained the right to maintain

^ DGFP, XI, 35~3o,
Zj,A
s /\
.Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, o3-ovi
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consular offices on the main islands to observe the demilihn
t&rization and see that no new fortifications mere built, 1
This settlement seemed more desirable to the Finns than a
military cooperation with the Soviets, -but Finland was still
very interested in trying to get the Germans involved, in the
islands.

Shortly after the agreement with Bussia had been

signed, President Byti and Marshal Mannerheim told LieutenantColonel Veltjens that they hoped Germany would settle the
Aaland dispute by occupying the islands.

If an occupation

would not be feasible at that time, Finland would cooperate
with the Germans whenever they thought that an Invasion would
oe convenient. kg
The Petsamo negotiations continued to produce nothing
but the same obstinate impasse.

The Soviets seemed more

anxious to gain the concessions now that German troops were
in the area, but they were also forced to modify their de
mands for the same reason.

Molotov informed Ambassador

paasikivi on September 1^ that the Soviet Union wanted the
Petsamo concession or the Institution of a joint Busso-Finnish
com.p8.ny to direct the production "of the ore,

Paasikivi tried

to explain the difficulty of arranging either of the two
proposalsa

First of all, it was still felt that it would.not

be legal to revoke the Mond Company's concession.

Secondly,

'Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 65-67•

48DGFP, XI, 361.
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since Finland had already refused the German request for the
concession for the same reason, it would now be very diffi
cult to reverse the decision in favor of the Soviet Union, ^
In mid-September, the Finns once again asked the German
Foreign Office about Its interest in Petsamo,

Weizsaecker

told Paasikivi that Germany had given up the idea of trying
to obtain the concession, but it was still interested in
seeing that the Russians did not get a, foothold in the area.-'to
On October 8 r Ribbentrop indicated that it would try to give
Finland more support,

Russia had continued its Impatient

demands for a settlement on Petsamo, and Germany felt that
the Finns5 will to resist had to be bolstered once again.
Arms were sent to Finland, but Germany still wished to main
tain peace in the Baltic,

Finland was advised t o •continue

the "dilatory negotiations" as long as it.could.'
In late October and early November, the Petsamo talks,
were reaching a point of crisis.

Paasikivi was again asked

why a settlement had not been reached,

Molotov claimed that

he had received permission from the British to transfer the'
concession to the1Soviet Union.'"*

tie said that if Finland

1
'yFinland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 61-62,
5°DGFPi XI, 105,
51Ibld,, 270-271, 328, 397-398.
'“Britain had said that if uhe concession were transfered it would like to see Russia receive it if they promised
to ship no ore to Germany,
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did not deliver a definite answer on the question in two or
three days, " ,., the USSR would be compelled to take mea
sures which the situation demanded.

"

The Finns still did

not promise to agree to the proposal despite the Soviet
threat»

The tensions between Russia and Finland continued

until Molotov went to Berlin in November for conferences
with Hitler and Ribbentrop,
For several months the German Foreign Office had been
trying to get 'Molotov to come to Berlin for talks.

The1

Soviet Foreign Commissar traveled little, but 'since Ribbentrop
had been to Moscow on several occasions it was felt that he
should reciprocate the visits,

Although the talks of November

12 and 13 covered a wide variety of topics, they did display
the underlying currents of tension that existed between -the
two powers on the subject of Finland.

The growing Nazi .

influence in Finland seemed to dominate Molotov's remarks
from the beginning of the talks.

In a review of the success

o f .the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, Molotov said that
every article had been fulfilled except for Finland.

Molotov

believed that, while he had no criticism of the German atti
tude during the Winter War, Germany was not respecting the
proposed Russian sphere of influence In Finland,

Hitler

replied, that he had no political interest In Finland, but he
was interested In resuming economic relations and maintaining

tiV
-^Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, 73-
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the transit agreement to facilitate the troop movement to
northern -Norway,

As to the recent Soviet pressures on

Finland, the Fuehrer told Molotov that Germany could not
allow a new war to develop in the Baltic.

The world's senti

ment was with Finland, and the war would cause severe hard
ships on the Belch's war effort.

Molotov complained that

the German troops in Finland caused the Finns to be intran
sigent. in their relations.with the Soviet Union.

The troops,

Hitler said, were not permanently stationed there and they
would be removed in the near future.

In .the' meantime, Germany

would have to leave them there in order;to. -help move troops.
' ''
T
’ 59
to
Norway.-'
Although very little was decided'at the meetings, the,
talks have to be considered as a diplomatic victory for the
Germans.

Russia, had tried to eliminate the German presence

In its sphere, of influence, but Hitler asserted that the .
status quo would have to be maintained due t o .the situation
of the war.

Molotov m s quite adamant and even a little

menacing when he spoke of Finland,

He said, that the Reich's

diplomacy was ambiguous, and he asserted that Nazi-Soviet
relations could be cleared up only If an understanding were
reached on Finland.

Since no understanding was- reached,

it was an Indication that Finland had finally begun to
supercede Germany's interest in maintaining friendly relations

■^Nazi-Soviet Relations, 239— 290,

QO
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with the USSR,
The Soviet Union continued to try to force Germany to
limit its influence in Finland after the talks had ended.
On November 26, Molotov Informed the German Foreign Office
that Russia would join the Axis Powers in the recently proposed. Four Power Pact30 if, among other things, Germany
withdrew its troops from Finland and negotiated a new secret

<■7

protocol on the area. '

The Reich Ignored the Soviet request,
CO
although Russia continued, to ask for a reply .-30
Despite the Soviet concern over Finland, Reichsmarshal'
Goering decided to send Lieutenant-Colonel Veltjens to Helsink
to continue military talks on November 25.

Finnish military

strength was to be assessed and. the Finns were to be giver- a
review of the talks with Molotov.

They were told that the.

final decision on the Petsamo question was up.to them, but
they need not worry about any future tensions,59

<rile Reich

had not yet promised to aid Finland In a, war with Russia, but
the Finns were led to believe that Its assistance was inevi
table .

When Veltjens returned to Berlin, he reported that

r' (f

^•^NazI-Soviet Relations, 240-247.
^^fSA Three Power Pact had been signed by Germany, Italy,
and Japan on September 27, 1940.
fNazi-Soviet Relations , 2>b-2p9 »
■58Ibid., 270-271.
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Finland was badly in need of planes and it had requested two
or.'three, batteries of heavy artillery.

o

General Ealaer,

upon reading the report, wanted to know .how long it would
take to make "quiet preparations" for an offensive from
Finland to the southeast of Lake Ladoga, 61
The Finnish election in December became another item of
■contention in the growing Russian-Finnish-German political
trianglea

In November, President Kallio had announced his

•resignation because of ill health,
6l

scheduled, for December 19. J

62 and new elections were
-

The Finns had sought German

advice on the elections as early as the November visit of
Veitjens. At the tine, VeitJens was only able to say that
he thought the election of Marshal Mannerheim might be
6h.
"
. .tantamount to a declaration of war on Russia,” ‘ Later,
on December 2, Bluecher said that Germany could easily
influence the course of the elections because the Finnish
Electoral College felt that the new president would have to
be persona grata, in B e r l i n . Eibbentrop replied to Bluecher

O
GFP, XI, Sip.
°^Halder Diaries, V, r/l,
°~Since Kallio died very shortly after his resignation,
there Is no reason to believe that either the Russians or
Germans tried to pressure him into quitting his post,

63Upton? 190-191.
6ijT)GPP, XI, 813.
6^Ibid., 763.
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that the German Government did not care to comment on the
presidential candidates, but he did feel that the Finns
should evaluate the effect that Mannerheim* s election would
have on Finland's relations with Russia.

66

Russia seemed

-much more concerned with the elections than was Germany.
Gn December 7, Molotov informed Ambassador Paasikivi that If
Mannerheim, Xivimaki, or Svinhufvud were elected, the Soviet
Union would be forced to conclude that Finland, no longer
cared to observe the recent peace treaty.^?

The Soviet objec

tions to Kivimaki, the Finnish ambassador to Germany, and
Svinhufvud. the father of past Finno-German collaboration,
were obvious.

Mannerheim was singled put as unacceptable

because of his strong hatred of communism and the increased
emphasis on military preparations that he would undoubtedly
begin once he was elected.

Prime Minister Risto Eyti, who

had already been assuming the presidential duties during
Kallio9s ill health, was finally elected as a compromise
candidate.

A search for national unity found that Ryti was

the only candidate who would be acceptable to both the poli
tical right and left in Finland and also be persona grata, in
Berlin and Moscow. 6R

DGFP, XI, -799-800.‘ Mannerheim was not interested in
politics, and he was not seeking the presidency. However,
he could have had the office simply by asking for it.
^Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents, •82-83. DGFP, XI,

841.
b8Upton, 191-195.
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The military commitments between Germany and Finland
in early December were still very limited.

The transit

agreement had placed over one thousand German troops on .
Finnish soils, and .Veit jens ! visit to Helsinki laid a basis
for future planningj but, as yet, Germany!s •intentions of
using Finland as part of its plan to invade Russia were still
very nebulous.

The military accord between the two countries

began to take a much more definite shape when, on December 18,
Hitler released his war Directive #21.

This directive

spelled out the preliminary plans for Operation Barbarossa,
the code name for the invasion of Russia.

Listed under the

heading of "Probable Allies" the directive stated:
Rumania's and Finland's active parti
cipation in the war against Soviet Russia
is to be anticipated; they will provide con
tingents on either wing of our ground forces-.,:. •
In due course the Armed- Forces High
t ,
Command will approach these two countries
and make. arrangements as to the manner in
which their military contingents will be
placed under German command at the time of
their intervention.
Finland will cover the concentration
of the Gerraan Force North which will be
transferred from Norway, and the Finnish
troops will operate in conjunction with this
force, Moreover,/Finland will have to
neutralize Hanko.^9
The plan went on to state that Army Group XXI' would protect
Norway, secure the Petsamo area, and advance with the Finnish
troops against the Murmansk Railroad,

^ Nazi-Soviet Relations, 260-26^-.

Operation Barbarossa’s
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tactical plans 'were far from complete, but the basis of
Finland’s cooperation in the campaign had been established.
Hitler, in his assessment of the importance- of Finland,
felt that with Finnish support Leningrad could-be encircled
and Russia would then be cut off from'the Baltic.?^

Troop

movements for the invasion had already gotten underway.

By

the and of December of 19^0, there were one and a half moun
tain divisions, an infantry division, and an SS brigade
waiting to move from Norway into Petsamo and the Bybatchiy
Peninsula .?1

Now, it was only necessary to complete the plan

of attack and coordinate it with the Finnish General -Staff.
The final plans for the attack from Finland were well
begun.

In August, the plans for the attack on Petsamo had

been drawn up under the code name of Operation Benntler .?2
On January 16, 1940, General von Falkenhorst,73 the Commander
of the German army in Norway, was ordered to complete the
necessary plans for an attack on Russia from the Lake OnegaLake Ladoga area.

He completed the plans on January 27* and

they'became known by the cover name of Silberfuchs.

This

70
'halter warlimont, Inside Hitler6s Headquarters, 19339*
lg46. trans. by R, E. Barry (New Yorks Frederick A. Praeger
.19&TT. 138 a
71thladder Diaries. IV, 09 . '
?2Ziemke, 121
73,
,
’General
von Faulkenhorst was also with the German
forces in Finland in 191-8.

attack envisioned the use of Finnish troops in a mass attack
east of Lake 'Ladoga and then south toward the Svir Fiver.
Finland would he asked to provide for the security of its
southern coast and the Aaland Islands„'while the German attack
would be directed further north from Salla to the White Sea
In order to join up with the forces of Operation Benntier
and trap the Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula.^
On January 27 < Marshal Mannerheim received an invitation
to send one of his staff officers to Berlin, to lecture on
the Winter War.

Mannerheim sent his Chief of Staff, General

Heinrichs; and since he had reason to believe that the
German® s were going to use this meeting as an excuse to
inquire about Finland®s military strategies, he Instructed
Heinrichs to try to find out all he could about German war
plans In the ..North.

In Berlin, Heinrichs met with General

Haider and General Paulus, the chief planner of Operation
Barbarossa.

Haider did reveal some of the plans concerning

Operation Silberfuchsf and General Heinrichs, although Man
nerheim had instructed.him not to commit Finland to any
plans, told the German General Staff officers about Finnish
Ideas on mobilization and deposition of troops in case of a
war with the USSR.

The information that was received from

Heinrichs was almost enough to complete the final preparations

”'Ziemke , 125; and Haider Diaries, V, 115-116.
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for the northern attackJ rj
Flnno-Gsrman collaboration continued on February 19
when Colonel Euschenhagen, the Chief of Staff for German'
Forces in Norway, met with General Heinrichs and Colonel
Tapoeia, the Finnish Chief of Operations.

The conference

revolved about the operations from central and northern
Finland, especially the Petsamo area.

After the preliminary

conferences were over, Euschenhagen traveled north with
Tapoeia to inspect the area around Rovanjemi, Petsamo,
Urinsalmo, and Kuusamo,

As a result of these tours, the

German High Command in Norway was able to work out an exten
sion of Operation'Sllberfuchs, which was to be known as
Operation P1a11nfuchs .10
At the talks in Helsinki, the Finns expressed little
interest in participating in the attack from Petsamo.

The

area had great economic importance, but it had little senti
mental value to them.

Finland felt that arr attack on the

north should be the responsibility of the .Germans,

The Finns

/

greatest concern seemed to be the reconquest of the areas
lost to the Soviet Union in the Winter War,

Finland spoke

only of its local interests, and Euschenhagen had been
cautious in'his comments, saying that the plans should still

?5Ziemke, 124-126.
76
1 International Military Tribunal, Trials of War Criminals
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U.S. Government Printing Office, I9T7T 9 310■ Hereafter cited
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be thought of as theoretical.‘(
Russo-German relations continued to deteriorate until,
by I'larch 27» Ribbentrop was able to tell Japan1’s Foreign
Minister Matsuoka that diplomacy with Russia was "correct
but deteriorating.
be'crushed."

If Russia makes a false move she will

He added that the conditions in the Baltic

countries that Russia had occupied were ".terrible," and •
Germany was on its guard against further Soviet moves in'
the area,?®

In a later continuation of the talks Ribbentrop’

stated that German resistance to the Soviet Union with
respect to Finland was based on economics and sentiment.
Germanys according to the Foreign Minister, could never
allow Finland to fall to Russia.?^
The German Government also displayed a desire to see
Sweden become involved In the Northern war plans.

The Reich

did not expect Sweden to enter the war, but it felt that
Sweden might aid by supplying transit rights to German troops
moving from southern Norway to Finland.

Sweden had already

given limited transit rights to the German array shortly
after the fall of Norway,

P0

and It was now felt that the

schedule of attack for Operation Silberfuchs could be

??DGFP, XII. 124-126
78 Nazi-Soviet Relations, 281-288, passim.
?9lbid., 303-311, passim,

1C?
maintained only if Sweden agreed to grant passage,

Germany

thought that the Swedes might .grant the necessary coopera
tion if they ’wished to help Finland in a new war with the
Soviet Union,

Swedo-Finnish ties had been close during the

year following the Winter War,

There had been plans of a

political union between the two countries, but this had been
discouraged by both the Germans and the Russians,

Still,

Sweden did continue to give indications that it would give

support to Finland if it were attacked again.
After inquiries were ms.de by the German Foreign Office,
it was learned that Sweden would aid Finland only if Russia
were the aggressor.

It would not lend support if Finland

attacked first, nor would it assist if Finland joined the
war on the side of the Axis Powers»

However, Germany still

hoped to find a way to make Sweden permit' German forces to
cross its borders.
The final preparations for the German-Finnish military
■cooperation were made in May,

General Jodi, on May 12, told

the Foreign Office that it had become urgent to enter into
detailed discussions with Finland on matters pertaining to
troop transportation, joint operations, and the composition
of the high command, for the Finnish Theater,

The German

attack-on Yugoslavia and Greece had increased the tensions
between Russia and. Germany*

8idgfp, 633/ 620-621,

This, plus the' continued delay

J..08
of the invasion of Great Britain, made the implementation
of Operation Barbarossa more and more a reality.

The QKW

ranted the proposals for the conferences to be made by the
Foreign Off.ice, because the army still wanted Finland to
think that .Operation Barbarossa was a theoretical plan and
8?
not a matter of immediate concerns ~
Earl Schnurre left for Helsinki on May 20 in order to
inform the Firms of the talks.

Hitler had told, him to tell

President Eyti that the relations between Germany and the
Soviet Union were strained, but there was not yet a need to
declare war.

However, all eventualities still had to be pre

pared for, and Finland was requested to send officers to
Berlin so that they could be informed of "the alarming world
situation."'

President Ryti told Schnurre that Finland did

not desire to be drawn into the war between the great powers,
but it would fight if the Soviet Union attacked.

To the

question of whether Germany would consider a Russian attack
on Finland a casus belli, Schnurre answered yes.

Shortly

after the conversation, the Finnish cabinet voiced its .
unanimous consent to send military representatives to the
meetings in Berlin and' Salzburg.

83

Finland again chose to send General Heinrichs,

82DGFP, XII, ?8?,
u-%lannerheim, t06j and DGFP, XII, ii-06-40?. The Finnish
Diet was not informed of the talks. Only a. very few Finnish
officials knew the extent of the military preparations. ...
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accompanied by Colonel Tapoeia, to Germany.

The briefing

on Operation Barbarossa was conducted by General Jodi and
Colonel Euschenhagen.

At the meetings the German Staff was

careful not to inform the Finns of the part that Army Groups
Central and South mould play in the campaign in Hussia,
Tiiejr were only told of the plans for Finland and given a'.
general indication as to how this operation would coraplament.
the movements of Army Group North.

The Germans were not

suspicious of Finland but they did wish to maintain the
highest degree of seerecjn 84
After a short explanation of the worsening of BussoG-erman relations, Heinrichs and Tapoeia were told that the
High Command expected the Russians to collapse most quickly
in the Baltic.

The German arms'- proposed to drive through

■the Baltic States to Leningrad while the navy closed the
eastern end of the Baltic Sea.

The chain of command that

was proposed for the Finnish -Theater would place Finland*s
army in the northern and central areas under General von
Faulkenhorst.

The German and Finnish troops in the Lake

Ladoga front would be directed by Marshal Mannerheim.

The

plans for Operations Benntier, Sllfcerfuchs, and Platlnfuchs
were then introduced to the Finnish officers
After the plans were explained, General Heinrichs agreed

84 DCFP, XII, 879-880,
8^lbid., 880-882
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to the proposals on the formation of the high command, and
'the request for Finnish scouts and reconnaissance teams to
support Operation Renntier in the north, but he sought modi.f deration on other points .

The Germans wanted Finland to

support the attack in the center on Kandalaksha from Sails,
with one division as far as the border.

General Heinrichs

felt that this would detract from the Finnish effort on the
Ladoga front.

On the subject of Hanko, the Finns were to

seal off the port and wait for air, armored, and artillery
support, which would arrive in two or three weeks after the
main assaults in the north and east.

Again the Finns felt

that the two to three divisions which would be required to
complete the movement would be batter used in the southeast.
The Germans said that.it might be impossible for them to
participate in a campaign- against the port, as the assault
troops would have to be brought to that point through -Sweden
if they were to arrive at the beginning of the campaign *

The

last combat area that was discussed was the Aaland Islands,
Here, General Heinrichs believed that the Germans should
occupy the Islands before the main attack began.

This way,

Finland could begin Its mobilization without seeming to be
directing its forces at Russia,

The German High Command, of

course, was against any early occupation because it would
destroy the element of surprise for the main attack.

Other

items that were discussed concerned transportation, mobili
zation, arid the use of Finnish air fields by the Germans.

Ill
The German units were to begin to arrive in Finland between
June 10 and 15 .

‘
The Finns said that it would take them nine

days to mobilise, and they would not set a date for the
mobilization yet because they wanted to wait upon "develop
ments ."

The Finns had two major concerns about mobilization.

They were afraid that after they had begun to mobilize,
which would be an act of war in .the eyes of the Soviet Union,
Germany might decide to cancel its plans, leaving Finland
to face the Russians alone*

Secondly, Finland wanted the

world and even its own citizens to think that the USSR was
the aggressor.

It wanted to make secret preparations for

the war and then enter the conflict only after the Soviet
Union had violated Finnish territory.

On May 28, General

Keitel said that further talks would settle the few remaining
differences of opinion, and the Foreign Office would continue
to press Sweden for the necessary transit rights. 86
Sweden was being asked to allow German troops to pass
through on Swedish trains and roads*

The Swedes were also

being asked to allow the Germans and Finns to purchase a s •
O ry

many motor vehicles as possible .c •

Sweden had earlier said

that it might allow troops to pass through Swedish terri
torial waters, but it indicated that a passage by rail would

°°DGPP, XII, 882-885 1 Mannerheim, 40?-408 j and Ziemke
132-135.
87d g FP, XI. 104-0-1012
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not be permitted.

pQ

Sweden, did give in to German pressure

and allow one division to pass, but the permission was given
four days after the attack had begun.
The final talks were resumed in Helsinki on June 23.
Colonel Buschenhagen later reported that Finland was now
prepared to launch its attack in the south on either the
eastern or western side of Lake Ladoga with five days' notice.
The Finns proposed to use five divisions in the attack, but
they were not confident that they would be able to reach the
Svir River.

They also agreed to occupy the Aalands and seal

off Hank.0, but they insisted that the assault on Kanko be
led by a German d i v i s i o n . i n addition, Finland required
that Germany guarantee its continued independence and former
territorial borders.

General mobilization was to begin on

June ly»/On the morning of June 22, Germany, invaded the Soviet
Union through the plains of Poland,

Russia had been getting

reports of the German troop concentrations on its borders,
but it did little to prepare for the attack.

Hours after

the invasion had begun* Hitler read an address to the German
people, informing them of the reasons for the new turn in

88DG?P, XI, 322,
^Ziemke, 139»
9°Ibid,, 13k,
91dgfp, xii, 963.

the war.

Included in the .speech was a paragraph on Finland

which stated:
In alliance with their Finnish com
rades, the victors of Narvik stand on the
shore of the Arctic Ocean. German divi
sions, led by the conqueror of Norway,
along with Finnish liberation fighters undeg
their Marshal, protect Finland's territory.
The Finns, though they had not yet declared war, were
now allies in name and fact with the Third Reich.

The Soviet

Union, although confused by the German attack, did not wait
long to strike at Finland.

On the morning of the 22nd,

several Russian batteries opened fire into Finnish territory,
and Helsinki was bombed a little later.^

Finland did not

retaliate, as it wanted It to be very evident that the Soviet
union was the aggressor.

Finally, on June 25, Finland

decided to take "defense" measures, and for the Finns the
Winter War had become the Continuation War.

9^Upton, 282.
^Mannerheim, 512.

CHAPTER IV
THE COLLABORATION
One week after Hitler's address which announced the
Nazi-Finnish collaboration in the war against Bussia,
Marshal Mannerheim made his own call to arms.to the Finnish
people»
I summon you to a Holy War against
the enemy of our people, From graves
covered with summer green our fallen heroes
rise at this moment to join us anew, as,
in conjunction with the great war power of
Germany and as its companion in arms, we
march out to a crusade against our enemy,
in order to create a secure future for
Finland,
Brothers in arms! Follow me once
more, for the last time, now when Karelia
rises and the dawn of a new day for Finland
gleams before us *1
News of the G-erman attack on the Soviet Union brought
no great joy to the Finnish people.

The memories of the

bitter suffering during the Winter war were still fresh in
their memories,

andeven though the collaboration with

the

Nazis had been kept from the people, even the most politi
cally innocent knew that Russia would soon spread 'the war
into Finland,‘ For almost three years': the Soviet leaders had
told the Finns that Russia would never wait for a German

“'Lund in, 12?,
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attack to develop from the north.

The- Husslan positions

along the Finnish border had been strengthened since the
Winter War, and now, since Hitler's statement on the FinnishGerman alliance in arms, the Soviet course of action could
be predicted with ease.

Marshal Mannerheim"s address was

far from unanimously accepted by' either the average Finnish
citizen' or by the leaders of state,.

Finland had, in the

past, been considered as one of the buffer zones between
Christlam Europe and the "Barbaric Hordes" to the east, so
the call to a "Holy War" may have attracted some.

However,

the rest of the speech was a flagrant overstatement of Finnish
war aims,

Finland did hope to eliminate the threat of Soviet

belligerence, but the irredentist spirit to claim Soviet
■Karelia, a land that had not been included in Finnish borders
for over five-hundred years, was almost completely absent,
For most Finns, the war was lust a painful necessity, forced
upon them by a system of international power politics over
which they had no control*

Finland was not pro-Nazi, nor

was it even ardently pro-German.

There were cultural and

religious ties with Germany which could not be discounted,
but Finland's post-World War I years had been spent trying
to develop new cultural, political, and economic alliances
with Sweden and Great Britain, not Germany,

The Finns, with

’the exception of a very few pro-Nazis, looked upon the asso
ciation with Germany as an alliance forced upon them by the
everpresent threat of Soviet domination and the political

Isolation caused by the German conquests in the West,

Fin

land wanted, the world to believe that Germany was a "cobel
ligerent" in the Continuation War.

It, however, did not want

the Allies to believe that Finland was a permanent German
ally In the wider European war.

From the past experience of

the Winter War, the Finns realized that Germany was- using
Finland as a pawn in it's attempt to establish the Thousand
Year Reich,

If at all possible, Finland would now like to

use Germany as expediently as possible in the Continuation
’■
2
war,
The German campaign began on June 22 with the execution"
of Operation Remitler into Petsamo.by the 27,500 men of Moun
tain Corps Norway;

The territory between Finnmark and the-

eastern Russo-Finnish border was covered in two days.

On

June 22, the command of the Army of Norway ordered that the
attack on northern Russia should begin on June 29.

The German

operations in Finland north of the Karelian front were
divided Into two sectors.
tion was SIlberfuchs »

The code name for the entire opera

The attack in the far north was called

Flatinfuchs while the campaign on the mideastern Russo-Finnish
border was named Polarfuchs,

platInfuchs was to secure the

Petsamo nickel fields, seal off and. capture the Rybatchiy
Peninsula, and move east to Murmansk.

Polarfuchs was to

feature an attack from central Finland near Salla northeastward

2
Lundin, Chapter VII, "Finnish Mar Alms and the Karelian
Cuestion,"• 113-144, pa.ssim,
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to the city of Kandalaksha on the Murmansk Railroad,

Hitler

hoped that the control of the Russian north would produce
psychological as well as military'victories.

If Murmansk

and the railroad leading south to Leningrad were captured,
Russia would be cut off from any possible British support.
The main German attacks on Russia were' directed at Leningrad,
Moscow, and Stalingrad,

Operation Sllberfuchs was decidedly

a secondary effort, secondary even to the Finno-German cam
paign in southern Karelia; but it did hope to secure the
northern Arctic shores which Hitler believed were vulnerable
O
to a British attack
Several factors In Operation Platlnfuchs5 plan of attack
caused great concern in the German High Command,

Hitler had '

Insisted that seven divisions of the Army of Norway remain
In northern Norway to guard against 8, British invasion.
This decision severely lessened the number of assault troops
that were needed to insure a rapid victory before the winter
set in.

Secondly* the supplies for the forces in northern

Finland were to be brought overland from Narvik on a road
that lacked an all-weather surface.

Next, the terrain and

climate of northern Finland and Russia were not at all advan
tageous to the German Blitzkreig.

There were very few roads

In the area, and the topography was better suited for the
Soviet defensive positions that it was for the German assau.lt

^Ziemke, l60~l65; and Lundin, 151-153.
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wuxua.

Although it was now summer, the mild weather could

be expected to last for only one more month.

Then the

Li
r a m s would turn the few existing roads into mud."*
Platlnfuchs was directed by General Dietel, and his
early objectives, though limited, proved to be too ambitious
under the existing circumstances.

The original assault was

to seal off the Rybatchiy Peninsula and Kola Bay and then.,
\

if time and weather permitted, Murmansk was to be taken.
The attack was launched on schedule toward the initial objec
tive, the Litsa Elver south of the Rybatchiy Peninsula, but
the advance was slowed by the terrain and the strong Soviet
resistance.

The Germans had expected to meet Russian reserve

units -in -that area, but they were surprised, to find two crack
Soviet divisions between .the Litsa River and the Finnish
border.

The Rybatchiy Peninsula was sealed off on July

but the Germans did not have enough troops to move north to
capture it.

The attack on Litsa was nearly a complete failure

The Germans reached, the river, but they were soon driven back.
General Dietel asked Hitler to release additional troops from
Norway, but the Fuehrer believed that they were needed where
they were,
began.

By the middle of September, the autumn rains

The Army Corps of Norway then began to prepare its

winter, line, of defense west of the Litsa.

Platlnfuchs had

■produced an early stalemate, a stalemate that was to last

‘LZiemke, l6?~i68.
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until the summer of 19^4. ^
Operation Polarfuchs, under the direction of General
von Falhenhdrsts moved east from the Salla railroad toward
Kandalaksha on July 1.

In this attack there was almost an

even number of both Gorman and Finnish troops *

'The German

XXXVT Corps, consisting of two divisions had been joined by
the Finnish 3rd and 6th Divisions,

The Germans and Finns

were not integrated into a single unit and they had different
objectives, but they were both under the same German command,
Polarfuchs turned into a repetition of Platinfuchs: early
advances were met by exceedingly stiff Soviet resistance.
The Russians had obviously prepared well for the German
attack in the north, ana as long as they had the Murmansk
Railroad they would have little difficulty bringing in sup
plies and replacements,

.The initial German drive was broken

off on July 8 'when the Russians launched a strong counter
offensive,

For the rest.of the summer there were offensives

and counteroffensives of a very minor nature, and this

6
sector also went into winter positions hopelessly stalemated..
Although Operation Sllberfuchs did not produce the
results that had been expected, the war on the Ladoga-Karelia
front was much more encouraging to the Germans,

Here, the

Finns were more willing raptieluants, and the drive of Army

•%ieinke» l 69~l?2 3
^Mannerheim, ^21-922,
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Group North across the Baltic States toward Leningrad had
forced the Russians to withdraw troops from this area.

The

Germans wanted the Finns to develop two lines of attack in
this sector.

One of then was to proceed due.south down the

Karelian Isthmus , and the other was to sweep .around the
northeast coast of Lake Ladoga to the Svir Biver and then
continue southwest until it linked up with Army Group North
to encircle Leningrad.

The Germans had high hopes for

Finnish success against the Russians,

The Finnish array had

been restocked, with German arms, and It now had the artillery*
mortars, and antitank weapons that it had lacked in the
Winter War,

In addition, the 500,000 men who had been mobi-

lized, nearly sixteen per cent of Finland's total population,
would be fighting against its age-old enemy In an attempt to
recover the portions of the homeland which had. been lost in
194-0,?
The Finnish offensive began on July 10 with the Army of
Karelia, under the command of General Heinrichs, making a
thrust on either side of Lake Yanis, located a few miles
north of Lake Ladoga,

The attack was being directed, by

Marshal Mannerheim, and the troops employed in the operation
were almost exclusively Finnish.

Only the German 163rd

Infantry Division, which had originally been intended for
Operation Polarfuchs, was In the area, and it was to be used

Dianne rhein, 4-16-^18
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in reserve.

As expected, the Russians had, been forced to

.remove their reserves from the Ladoga-Karelia front in order
to bolster Leningrad’s western defenses.

When the offensive

began, the Finns had a clear three to one numerical superiO
oritjr over the Soviet troops.
From July 10 through the middle of August, the attack
went exactly as it had been planned.

The Finnish VI Corps

attacked from the northeast of Lake Yanis toward Lake Ladoga,
In six days it had covered sixty-five miles.

Upon reaching

Lake.'Ladoga, the offensive split into two branches: one. down
the eastern shore of the Lake and the other east in the
direction of Lake Onega.

By August 16, the Finnish forces

had crossed the 1939 Russo-Finnish borders and controlled
half of the isthmus between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega .9
The military cooperation between the Germans and the
Finns began to display serious differences of opinion in
mid-August.

Field Marshal Von Leeb’s Army Group North still

planned to complete the encirclement of Leningrad by joining
the Finns o n t h e Svir. , On August "2, QKH had asked Mannerheim
to ..plan a continuation of the attack that was now progressing
along the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga until it reached the
Svir River,

Mannerheim refused to comply, but he did agree

to push south along the Kare'lian Isthmus.

®Ziemke, 188-190,

9Ibld., 191-192.
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refusal to continue the attach to the'Svir was based on two
.considerations.

The German offensive which was aimed at

Leningrad had slowed considerably once it had entered Russia
proper from the Baltic States.

Mannerheim was reluctant to

extend his troops south into Russia until he had some posi
tive assurance that the Nazi forces could reach their goals.
Secondly, Mannerheim was personally interested only in re
gaining Finnish territory on the Karelian Isthmus and
extending Finland's border east into Soviet Karelia, where
the local population was expected to greet the Finns as
liberators,

A thrust into the Russian plains meant an esca

lation of the war that would extend Finland’s already inadequate army. 10
On August 13, Mannerheim ordered, his II Corps, I'jhich to
this time had made only a short drive to the northwest corner
of Lake Ladoga, to turn south into the Karelian Isthmus,

In

just a few days, the Finnish forces established a bridgehead
In the middle of the Isthmus,

To complement II Corps 8

attack, IV Corps launched an offensive down the western side
of the Isthmus toward Viipuri.

After cutting the Viipuri-

Leningrad rail line and encircling the city, the Finns pushed
on to the Pre-Winter War border and arrived there on
11
September 2»"x

-^Ziemke, 193~19^»
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As the Finns moved ahead, German-Finnish cooperation
again came into question.

Hitler had '-originally believed that

the capture of Leningrad was a prime military objective.

The

occupation of the second city of the USSR would produce a
great psychological victory for the Germans as well as give
them exclusive control of the Baltic Sea.
tion had turned to the south of Russia.

Now Hitler's atten
Here were the wheat

fields of the Ukraine and the oil of Bessarabia,

If this

area could be conquered first,.the Reich could divert these
materials to Germany in order to alleviate some of the
growing shortages at home.

Part of Army Group North was

diverted to the south and the encirclement, rather than the
capture, of the city was planned.

Since most of Leningrad's

food supplies came frora the south, it was felt that a seige
would not only bring about the ultimate defeat of the city,
but it would also drastically reduce, the size of the city's
population, making it much easier to occupy.

However, for

the, encirclement to be completed, it was felt that Finnish
forces would have to move to the Svir and then continue to
move on until they linked up with Army Group North, hoepfully
at Tikhvin .12
The call to launch a new offensive into Russia past the
defensive positions which had already been established drew
no immediately cooperative response from Marshal Mannerheim.

12Ziemke, 19^-196.*
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The large percentage of the population in uniform had begun
to tell on the nation’s economy.

In August, Mannerheim had

been forced to begin the release of the fourth platoon in
every infantry company.

In addition to this, the casualty

rates were much higher than they had been for the Winter War.
Mannerheim also knew from experience that the Bussian forti
fications in the area would be very strong.

In view of

these factors, he said that the attack could best be accom
plished by the German forces.^
The decision regarding the future deployment of Finnish
troops was not altogether in Mannerheim’s hands.

Leading

industrialists in Finland had been telling the' Marshal that
Finland’s economy would collapse unless more men were re
leased from the army.

The Finnish constitution also required

that the Commander-In-Chief receive permission from the Diet
before he committed troops past Finland’s borders.

Mannerheim

had strong control over his arms?' an^ his influence in the
government was immense.

If he had wanted to continue the

offensive, he-could have done so, but he .was forced to con
sider Finland’s best interests.

Finnish troops had already

crossed both the border established In 1940 and the preWlnter War boundary, but Mannerheim maintained that this had.
been done.to establish "defensive positions; ’’ If the Germans
continued their demand for a renewal of the offensive,

^-^Kanner he im, 42 6 -42 7 i
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•Mannerheim could stall them by pointing to Finland's internal'
economic problems.

At this point in the war, the waiting

game was exactly what' the Marshal wanted to"play.

If Army

Group North continued to meet stiff resistance around
Leningrad, it would mean that the Finns would .have a greater
distance to go before they could link up with' the Germans,
If the German thrust were strong enough to move'east rapidly
and, at the same time, force the Russians to withdraw some
of their forces in the Ladoga area, the Finns' might contem
plate an attack.

In the meantime, Mannerheim could afford to

stall, his offensive in order to watch the progress of Army
Group North.

A premature Finnish attack, unsupported by the

German advance, would produce a highly untenable salient into
.
. ■ 1A
R u s s ia .
The fact that Mannerheim refused to.go on the offensive
caused considerable consternation at OKH,

The High Command

altered its plans for. a tight encirclement of the outskirts
of Leningrad in order to divert forces toward the Svir.
Mow, the eastern arc of the encirclement would be several
miles from the city, but it would still be effectively iso
lated .

The movement toward the Svir was intended to encourage

Finland to continue Its offensive and keep the Russians tied
down on the Ladoga front.

At the end of August, the Germans

captured the last remaining railroad into Leningrad, but

^Ziemke, 197-198.
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the Russians could still supply the city through the gap
that existed from that point to the positions held by the
Finns north of the Svir. ^-5
The German High Command again asked the Finns for assis
tance , this time from a different direction.

If Leningrad

were taken rather than beseiged, the attempt to link up with
the Finns would lose much of its significance, and the large
number of troops now stalemated on the perimeter of.the city
could be used to continue the attack to the east and to the
south.

OKH now wanted the Finns to continue their offensive

on the Karelian.Isthmus to relieve some of the pressure of
the Soviet defenses to the south and to the west of. the city,
Mannerheim again refused, but he did agree to continue the
attack in the east to the Svir,
to be unduly obstinate.

Mannerheim was not trying

He did want the Germans to win the

war in the north, but he did not want to participate in the
destruction of Leningrad, 16

In fact, he had claimed that he

assumed the command in the war on the condition that he would
not have to lead his forces against Leningrad.

He knew the

extremes the Soviets would go to in order to protect the
city and he did not wish to face these defenses.

Then too,

Mannerheim had to consider the post-war consequences if
Russia should be victorious.

^Ziemke, 199*
■^Mannerheim, R26-^27-.

The Soviet terms with Finland
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would be much harsher If it took part in the destruction of

17

Leningrad,"u‘

_

After viewing the situation more closely,

Mannerheim decided that the strength of Army Group North was
not sufficient to launch the heavy attack that he wanted to
use to cover the movement of his own troops.

On September 25 1

he.informed OKH that an advance on either the Karelian or
the Ladoga Fronts was impossible, because he was being forced
to convert divisions into brigades to help alleviate the
1P
civilian manpower shortage.
In mid-October the Germans did begin a drive east
toward Tikhvin.

The city was taken in November.

But the

Russian resistance coupled with the winter weather' forced
the German army to retreat to the west bank of the Volkhov
River, where Hitler ordered that the line be held to the.
19

last man. '
On August 18, the United States, upon Russia's request,
communicated a peace offer to Finland.
in response.^

This was unusual.

No reply was received

Although the Finns had no

^Mannerheim, 9l6-4l7.
l82iemke, 200-201. ■^Ibid., 202-203« For a thorough study of the resistance
offered by the city of Leningrad, see Leon Goure's The Selge
of Leningrad (Stanford, California.* Stanford University Press,
1952) .
^ Foreign Relations of the United States, 19^1, Vol. I
(Washington; United States Government printing Office, 1958)>
56-57* Hereafter cited as United States Foreign Relations.
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intentions of withdrawing from the war at this time, they
still desired to maintain good relations with the Allies.
The Allies were still sympathetic with Finland.

The Finnish

Legation in London.had been closed on July 28, but the Bri
tish .continued to retain consular offices -in- Helsinki.

Great.

Britain-wanted -to see Finland get out of the war, but it had
made no overt objections to the Finnish advance to the
pre-Winter War borders.

21

On October 27, the American State

Department asked the Finns to pull back to the 1939 borders,
Finland again refused,

22

Finland's refusal of the overtures

made by the United States and Great Britain was now to a
large extent caused by German pressures,

Germany was Fin

land's chief source of war materials and :grains,

If it-..with

drew from the -war now, it would have nowhere to turn for.
these commodities.

Germany was also anxious to see Finland ■

break away from diplomatic contact with the West,

Since the

German Foreign Office realized that the Finns would not make
the break of their own accord, it decided to place Finlandin a compromising position.

In late October, the Finnish .....

.Government was informed that Germany 'wanted it.to sign the..
Anti-Comintern pact which was being renewed' In Berlin on
November 27.

It was hinted that grain shipments would -be' •

suspended if Finland did not comply.

Germany hoped that

p1
' Mannerheim, 432
^United States Foreign'Relations, 1941, Vol. I, 82-84
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Finland, by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact', would be that
much nearer to a full alliance with the Reich..

This in turn

would cause the Allies to lose their sympathy for Finland and
force the Finns into still, closer cooperation with the German
war aims.

On November 2?, Foreign Minister Witting flew to

Berlin to sign the Pact.

The event was given wide publicity

to the dismay of the Finns, who wished the signing to remain
•
23
as secret: as possible.

The year 19^1 ended with a virtual impasse on all fronts
near Finland.

In January of 19*f2, one major change was made

in German strategy for the North,

General von Falkenhorst

had been ordered back to Norway at the beginning of the year,
and General Dieted replaced him as the Commander of all German
forces in Finland.

The United States’ entry Into the war had

caused. 'Hitler to become more apprehensive, and he believed
that'Norway had to be strengthened further.

The British navy

■had recently shelled coastal positions in Norway and- made
commando raids on several off-shore islands.

Hitler began to

,believe that Norway might prove the•"Zone of Destiny in this
W ar,”

Accordingly, the Fuehrer ordered the transfer of the

battleships which had stationed at Brest to the Norwegian
coast, 2 k

in January and February, the ships did force their

way through the English Channel, but while the'new plans

z^Zlemke, 207-208,
ph.
~ Fuehrer Conferences, 19^2, 6,
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strengthened Norway, they also drew reserve strength from
northern Finland.
At the beginning of 19^2, the plans for an offense
against the Russians in the North were completely undecided
after the failure of Silberfuchs.

Since von Falkenhorst had

returned to Norway, the Army of Norway had been renamed the
Army of Lapland, and Hitler had promised to strengthen it
with five fortress battalions for the Kirkenes-Pechenga area.
Hitler was still interested in capturing Murmansk, but at
the time he was more concerned with protecting the Petsamo
nickel fields.

However, before the new troops could arrive,

ice had closed the northern Finnish ports, and the transfer
-was postponed until the spring.

The delay was a severe blow

to the Army of-' the Lapland, as the additional units would
have released some of the troops which had been guarding the
area and this would have given a greater impetus to a new
German offensive.
The severe winter weather and difficulties in supply
and transportation caused the stalemate to continue through
March»

In late March and early April, the Finns had been

able to capture several small islands in the Gulf of Finland,
but no major offensive was begun by either side on any of
the three fronts.
The Soviet army to the east of Salla had been successful

25Ziemke, 221-225.
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in its attempt to strengthen its numbers.

The Army of Lap- \

’land was late in detecting the build up due to a severeshortage of reconnaissance planes, but when it was discovered-/'
■General Dieted thought that the Russians would not attempt
an immediate offensive,

The spring thaw was imminent and

the roads would soon be impassable.

The Soviets, however,

saw this as an advantage; they planned to advance before the"
thaw began, and then stop to solidify their, gains with no •:
PA
fear, of a counterattack after the roads.did turn to mud. °
The Soviet offensive was launched- on April' '2k,

The

attack gained some ground, but the Germans inflicted large
losses on the Russians and they were forced to pull back
because of a lack of fresh troops.

General Dieted, at the

height of the attack, had asked the Finnish 12th Brigade be
assigned to his III Corps,

Mannerheim refused when he thought

that he would permanently lose the unit in the prolonged
struggle to the north,

By May 7» the Russian attack had

been completely'halted, and Dieted decided to risk a speedy
counterattack while the’Russians were still off balance.

The

Germans, like the■Russians, also saw their plans stymied by
bad weather,

During the course of the limited counterattack,

the Finnish troops under Dieted*s command, showed an indepen
dence of mind that bordered on-insubordination.

General

Siilasvuo, the Finnish commander in the north halted his
of
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■units’ attack without permission, threatened to withdraxf
his troops from the attack, and demanded that all the horses
and wagons which the Finns had loaned to the Germans be
returned, at once.

General Dietel was forced to appeal to

Siilasvuo in the name of "brotherhood-in-arms" to keep him
from endangering the flanks of the German’s advanced posi+ , _ c. 2 ?

By the end of the summer, the battle lines had changed
little.

However, the Germans claimed that they had been

victorious during those months because o f .the heavy losses
they had inflicted on the attacking Russian forces.

The most

notable change in the.course of the campaign was the fact
that nearly all of the Finnish units in the area were removed
by September 25*

Dietel did not want to have to depend on

commanders and men who were not responsive to his commands.

pQ

The war in the extreme north of Finland also showed
little progress.

On June

Hitler and General Keitel flew

to Finland for military talks and also to honor Marshal
Mannerheim on his seventy-fifth birthday.

In the conferences

General Dietel told Hitler that the Army of Lapland did not
have enough troops either to take or to hold the Eybatc-hiy
Peninsula.

Hitler-was reluctant'to give up this part of the

operation in the north, as he still believed that this area

27Ziemke9 225-22?.
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could be used as an Allied landing point.

The Fuehrer

decided to strengthen the Fifth Air Force in- the area, but
he could still not spare more t r o o p s . ^9
In June the Army of the Lapland was redesignated as the
Twentieth Mountain Army.

As doubtful as the operation was,

it was still assigned the task of securing the Rybatchiy
Peninsula.

Plans, under the code name Wiesengrund, were

drawn up, but, as Dietel had predicted, his army lacked the
reserves and the transportation to begin the offensive,

In

order to mount some kind of an attack in.the north, Operation
Lachsfang was planned in late July,

This scheme called for

•an. attack on the Murmansk Railroad In the area of Kandalaksha,
The Germans were to use the heavy air support from the Fifth
Air Force and 80,000 men In the attack, twice the number
used to support Platinfuchs in 1941.

The offensive was to

begin in September, and the Finns were requested to mount an
auxiliary attack from the south.

General Heinrichs agreed to

the plan, but he said that Leningrad would have to be- taken
and an advance made to the Svir River before he could promise
on
full cooperation.-'
Operation Lachsfang promised some success if the Finns
gave the necessary support, but the Finnish participation
hinged on the outcome of Army Group North's attempt to take

“^ziemke, 229-230; and Mannerheim, 450-454,
9Ibid. > 231-233; and 456.

13
Leningrad before the northern attack began.

Fuehrer Direc

tive Number 45 of July 23, 1942, ordered that Leningrad be
taken by September.

Army Group North was to be strengthened

by five divisions from Army Group South.

The.command of

.Army Group North still felt that the operation would, take a
minimum of -three months to complete even with the additional
support.

The Russians now had thirteen divisions facing the

Germans in the north, and the total German strength, with
the additional troops would be ten divisions, eight short of
the number that was felt would be needed to gain a speedy
victory.

'

On August 8 , General Georg, von Kueehler, who had "re- •
placed General von Leeb as the commander of Army Group. North,
told Hitler that he would need more troops to take Leningrad.
His arm;;- was outnumbered by two to one, and he believed that
it would take until the end of October to complete the tacti
cal plans unless a large number of reinforcements could be
brought up.

Hitler had no more troops to spare, and the

operation had to be completed by September to give the Finns
time to move their forces into position for Lachsfang.

The

The attack was then scheduled for September 10, and General
Manstein, who had just directed the successful seige of
Sevastopol, was brought in to try to work a miracle at

Ziemke, 233? and Mannerheim, 458.
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Leningrad.

The attack was now named Operation SNordlicht

op

Even Manstein was not confident of success at Leningrad.
'He felt that massive air and artillery strikes could not be
counted on to break the Soviet resistance v. He also believed
that the attack on Leningrad could best be made from the '
Karelian Isthmus, and, in any event, the operation would have
to be made by attacks from both the ’-German and the Finnish.
fronts.33
Before the Germans had a chance to begin Operation
Nordlicht, the Soviet Union began Its own offensive in order
3k
to open a land avenue to Leningrad.
The Soviet attack
gained a small breakthrough and Operation' N.ordlicht was com
pletely thrown off schedule.

-On September 1, Hitler announced.,

that Operation Lachsfang was cancelled for 19^2 and the imple--'
mentation of Nordlicht was made dependent on the continuation ■
of good weather and the ability to-assemble the necessary '
troops.

On September 4, the Finnish Army Headquarters stated;

that the possibility of Finland’s participating In Nordlicht
was "extremely limited." 35

■32ZIemke, 233-23^.
-^Warlimont, 253-25^*
Ojj
J 'The Russians had been forced to bring supplies across
Lake Ladoga by .-ferry In the summer and by truck in the winter
when the Lake was frozen over,
-^Zienike, 233-235« Marshal Mannerheim almost completely
ignored Operation Nordlicht in his memoirs,
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Germany's hopes of beginning Nordlicht were vastly over
optimistic.

The Russian attack on the German right flank

;continued until mid-October.

The weather had now begun to

turn, and the Finns still showed no signs that they would
cooperate.

At the end of the month, the additional troops

which had been given to Army Group North were sent south to
help cover the line between Leningrad and Moscow.

With

this decision, Operation Nordlicht had to be postponed
inde finitely.-^
The year 19^-2 had produced no visible Nazi gains in the
North, and there were signs that Germany's position was
beginning to deteriorate.

German troops were now extended

from the Arctic Ocean.to the Black Sea, and the quick vic
tories that-Hitler had hoped would envelope and destroy large
numbers of Russian troops, .had not materialized.

Now that

-the Soviet Union had had a chance to strengthen its forces,
the Fuehrer was forced to juggle his troops to gain the
necessary strength to mount an offensive at any given point.
The war of attrition had now begun to tell on the forces of
the'Reich.

Finland continued, to bide its time, waiting to

see how the course of the war would turn before it continued
to give support to Germany.
The year 19^3 became a year of decision and a time of
frustration for the Nazis.

•>&Ziemke, 236,

It had now been almost a year and
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.a half since the German army had arrived at the outskirts
of Leningrad and the city had still not fallen.

The front

in the north of Finland had become so static that OKH
referred to It as "the front without combat activity,"

in

the North Sea and the Arctic, British naval superiority
remained to threaten the German supply routes to the north
and cause Hitler to worry about a possible Allied invasion
of Norway or Finland.
The recent Allied efforts in Africa, had made Hitler
increasingly apprehensive that the Allies might also try to
spread the war to the north,
also extended to Sweden,

The Fuehrer8s suspicions had

He believed that Sweden would

cooperate with the Allies if an attack did develop.

If the

Allies did gain control of the Norwegian coast, the Army of
Norway and the troops In northern 'Finland would be virtually
Isolated from their supply routes.

On February 10, orders

were sent to Norway to begin plans for an invasion of Sweden,
By the "end of March the plan had. nearly been completed'";
however, the operation was never put into effect,

Troops

from Norway would have to be used in the attack, and this
would weaken the coastal defenses of Norway,

An attack on

Sweden at this time might cause the Allied invasion that it
was trying to prevent.

The German navy also believed that

Leningrad would have to be captured and the Soviet Baltic
Fleet eliminated before naval support could be given to the

1OQ
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On
U T"'UclClvo
In January of 1943, the Germans were experiencing diffi
culties on all three fronts In Russia,

The German Sixth

Army was facing defeat near Stalingrad,• and the Russian
offensive that had begun on Army Group North's right flank
was continuing to broaden the gap between Lake Ladoga and
Leningrad,

The Soviet offensive in the north had lasted for

two and a half months, and it had cost them over a quarter of
a million casualties, but the advance was a severe shock to
Finnish morale.

The further the Germans were driven back,

the more isolated the Finnish forward positions became.

If

Leningrad were freed from the seige, the Finns could expect
to feel increased Soviet pressure In their sectors.
At a conference at the Fuehrer Headquarters on January 14,
Old'/ tried to assess the value of the Finnish army in the war.
The assessment produced, a decidedly negative estimate,

It

was felt that the military strength of the Finns had been
overestimated•

The Finnish army had no inclination to mount

any supporting offensives. It was almost without reserves,
and it was expected to lose ground to s, Soviet attack.

Its

only advantage seemed to be that, while it continued to hold
its defensive positions, the Soviets were forced to keep
troops in the Finnish sectors, troops which the Soviet Union

'"'^Ziemke, 252-264, pas s1m,
3bIbld., 242.
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would 11ice to use to free Leningrad..-"'
While OKW was theorizing on the role of' the Finnish: V
'army, Finland was

examining its own position.

•the day after the German surrender at

On February: j t ■

Stalingrad,MannerheimV;

President Ryti, Defense Minister Walden, and Prime Minister
Range11 met to discuss the situation.

They were particularly

worried about the fact that the German retreat- from Leningrad,
which was not yet too serious, would bring a heavy Russian
counterattack against the Karelian Isthmus,

During the con

ference, they agreed on two points s. the war had reached a
turning point and Finland must use the first possible opportunity to get out

i]*0
of it.

A secret session of the Diet met

on February 9, and

Colonel Paasonen, Head of the Intelligence Department, gave
the representatives a review of the military and political
situation at the time.

He stated that Germany and her Allies

had lost sixty divisions on the eastern front.

Germany was

beginning to weaken, and an Allied attack on France would
cause the -collapse of the German army•

He ended his resume'"

by saying that it■would be wise to become familiar once again
with the idea of being forced to conclude a second peace with
K O S C O V .4l

-^Ziemke, 242-243'
^Mannerheim, ^60,
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New elections were held in Finland on February 15? and
■President R y t i , w i t h the support of Marshal Mannerheim, was
again chosen to lead his country.

R y t i 's first task was to

try to construct a new government that could extricate Fin
land from the war.

Dr. Henrik Ramsay, who was reputed to

have excellent connections with Great Britain, was chosen as
b?
the new Foreign Minister. ~
_

It was not long before Finland

received news f r o m the A l l i e s .

On M a r c h 20,

the United State

Charge d 8Affaires offered to help establish diplomatic con
tact b etween Finland and the Soviet Union.^
Dr. R a m s a y ’s first mistake in his new post was the
c ommunication of the united States'

offer and F i n l a n d ’s in

tentions to Germany's Foreign Minister.

Ramsay felt that he

could begin to pave the way for a "friendly withdrawal" from
the war, but B i b h e n t r o p soon dispelled this naive contention.
B i b b en t r o p demanded that Fin l a n d reject the A m e r i c a n offer

and. Issue a public d e c l a r a t i o n that it wo u l d not sign a s e p a 
rate peace w i t h the Soviet Union.

F i n l a n d could not afford

to refuse because it was still dependent on G e r m a n y for a
large percentage of its foodstuffs, but it realized that the
decl.ara.tion would endanger Its position with both the Soviet
union and the Western Allies.

The American Charge' was' told

that Finland was unfortunately unable to avail itself of the

“f^Mannerhe i m , ^62-^63.
^ U n i t e d States F o r e i g n Relations,

1943,
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offer.

This vjas not enough for R i b b e n t r o p % he 'wanted some

assurance that F i n l a n d would not negotiate a separate peace*

To add force to his words, he recalled A m b a s s a d o r von Bluecher
back to Berlin for "consultations."

On May 16, President Ryti

did relent to a degree and made a speech that declared' that
Finland would rather continue the war than throw itself on
the mercy of the Soviet Union.

This.statement went far

enough to guarantee the continuation of German grain ship
ments, but Ribbentrop still realized that the Finns were
L'b
hesitant to mention an alliance with G e r m a n y .r*
OKU- believed that a German victory in the north would be
necessary to keep the Finns in the war.

As long as the G e r 

m a n a r m y was present in the Leningrad sector, a m o d i c u m of
c ooper a t i o n was expected f r o m the Finns.

A continued stale

mate in the district would cause Finland to continue to
think about withdrawing from the war?

8- G e r m a n retreat would

almost necessitate hurried Finnish negotiations with the
Soviet Union, J

Thus the d i l e m m a continued to present itself:

the Germans were depending on Finland's cooperation to main
tain' their positions in the north while the prospect of ..
Finnish cooperation was entirely dependent on the continued
m ainte n a n c e of the German p o s i t i o n s .
The war in northern F i n l a n d was all but forgotten while

^Mannerheim, ^63-^6^; and Ziemke, 243-2*i4.
" JZIemke , 2kk-2k$ ,
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new plans were made for the Leningrad front.

Hitler, knowing

the importance of Leningrad to the German position in the
east, ordered on March 13, that plans be made for the cap
ture of the city by late summer,

Army Group North felt than

a new offensive in the ares, was now dependent on what the
Russians would attempt during the summer months.

It had been

felt that the Soviets would either continue its offensive
near Leningrad or attempt to break through the German line
at the point of conjunction between Army Group North and
Army Group Center.

If the Russians did go on the offensive t

it was not known if the Germans could stabilize the front
long enough to launch an attack of their own.

bn

The operational plan for the capture of Leningrad was
•drawn up by General Kuechler* s staff and given the code name
Parkplatz.

The beginning of Parlcplatz was made dependent on

the success of Array Group South's latest offensive.

If Array

Group South could eliminate the salient formed by Russia's
winter offensive in the south, eight to nine divisions could
be transferea north to Leningrad,
be too optimistic.

This strategy proved to

The German attack in the south, which

began o n 'July 5» was repulsed, and the Soviet counterattack
pushed the Germans back to the Enieper River.

On July 22,

the Soviet .array in the north began an all-out offensive to
free Leningrad,

In facing impending disaster in both the

46
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now 'begun to set up defensive positions approximately 125
a7
miles southwest of Leningrad.
In July, she Finns continued to prepare for a withdrawal
from the war.

During the course of the month, the Russian

Legation in Stockholm informed the Belgian Minister that the
Soviet Union would be willing to begin peace negotiations
if Finland made the first step.

Finland replied that It

would consider the 1939 frontiers as a basis for negotiations,
but it would consider a rectification of the boundaries,
The United States was also, told that Finland would do nothing
to prevent an Allied invasion of Norway, nor would it resist
a movement into Finnish territory.

In August, thirty-three

prominent Finns presented Ryti with a petition calling for
a withdrawal from the war, and the Finnish press began to
agitate ior a separate peace.
Army Group North continued to hold around Leningrad
after a month and a. half of defending against.the Soviet
offensive.

However, work did continue on the defensive posi

tions on the Narva River-Lake peipus line.

The Twentieth

Mountain Army on September lb, told OK¥ that it thought that
Army Group North's withdrawal from Leningrad would endanger
its positIon in the north.

47Ziemke, 297.
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The retreat would force the Finns

i4T
to retreat from their present positions, shorten their lines,
and redeploy a majority of their forces to the Karelian
Isthmus *

The retread; could even cause the fall of President

Ryti's government.and the election of a .new president mho
would be in a better position to negotiate with the Soviet
Union.

If negotiations were begun and a treaty signed,, the

German forces would be forced to retreat into northern
Norway under winter conditions. A week after this re-port
was filed, the Finnish Government accented Army Group North's
pessimism when it informed the German High -Command that a
retreat from Leningrad would have the "most serious conseLic<

quences" for Finland. ,y
The Finns were not yet in a crisis situation.

Their

army outnumbered by two to one the Russian forces which•faced
•them.

Despite this numerical superiority, the Finns refused

to attack.

An offensive would complicate future negotiations

with the .Soviet Union and allienate Finland from the western
Allies.

Then, given the weakness of Army Group North's

position, the attack would only bring temporary' success.

If

the Finns .'advanced and the Germans retreated, Finland would'
also have to give, up its gains
On September 28, the Twentieth Mountain Army received
Fuehrer Directive Number 50.

"^Zlemke, 2A8.
5°lbid., 2^9 .

It said, that the position of
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Army Gro'ap North had been "stabilized," but unfavorable
developments were being prepared for.

In the event that

Finland withdrew from the war, the forces of the Twentieth
Mountain Army were to move back from its present positions
to a line south of Petsamo.

The nickel mines-were to be

held as long as possible, 5“f

Later, OKH.was informed by

General Dietel that Mar-Directive Dumber 50 mas impractical,
He felt that the British would be able to interdict his
supply -lines through the Arctic, and this would leave the
Twentieth Mountain Army without provisions, protecting mines
whose ore could no longer be transferred to Germany.d4The German array's position in the -Leningrad' sector was
made even more tenuous when the Russian army launched a newoffensive designed to break the line between Army Group North
and Army Group Center,

Within three days the German armies

had lost contact with each other.

Mannerheim now began to

think about preparing defensive positions of his own.

If the

Twentieth Mountain Army was forced to retreat, the Marshal
wanted to build a defense line west of the point where the
Germans were now entrenched.

On October lb, General Jodi

flew from OKU Headquarters to Helsinki for conferences with
Mannerheim and the Finnish Minister of Defense.
to be as encouraging as he possibly could.

'Uarlimont, 398
-^Ziemke, 251 •

Jodi tried

He reported that

:i>6
Italy* s recent set backs had not been a severe blow to the
Reich, and Germany looked forward to a confrontation with
the'Allies in Prance.

Jodi said, that the German defenses

In Prance would destroy the Allied land forces and allow
Germany to release troops for the Russian campaign.

The

General noted that he knew of Finland’s- desire to get out of
the 'war, but he warned that Russia’s peace conditions would
be harsh.

He concluded his argument by saying' that Finland

had two alternatives: continue the war as an ally of Germany
and protect its -homeland or risk Bolsnevization by surrender.^
The Finnish Government considered the situation so acute
that it disregarded Jodi’s advice and tried to' reopen contact
with Moscow through Madame Kollontai, the Russian Minister in
Stockholm.

The Finnish request was transmitted to Madame

Kollontai through the Swedish Foreign Office, and she said
that Finland could send a representative to Moscow.

A repre

sentative was not sent, "out Finland did let Russia know that
it was ready to conclude a peace if areas and cities which
were vital to its national existence were not claimed by the
Soviet■Union.

Madame Kollontai then informed Finland, her

personal opinion was that the recognition of the 1940 fron™
tiers would have' to be made before talks could begin.
The Russian offensive about Nevel, had not produced a

-'’Mamierhe im, 468 -469•
^Tbid.,- 470.
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decisive victory, but it caused the Germans to continue to
contemplate a withdrawal.

Hitler realized the effect that

the retreat would have on the Finns, but he felt that they
would be forced to, continue the fight for at least a short
time longer, giving the German army at least, a minimum of
relief while it established its new positions.

On December.

31, Hitler-drafted a letter to Mannerheim, informing him that
a retreat was imminent, but the letter was never sent.
The retreat from Leningrad was postponed in early January,
of 19^4, because of the difficulty it would cause for Fin
land and also because it would give the -Soviet Union a
cleaner control of the Baltic,

On January 14, the Prussians

began another offensive in the Leningrad sector.

By the

17th, Novgorod was encircled, and Leningrad was completely
liberated on the 19th.

General Kuechler ordered his troops

to withdraw to the defensive positions to escape being
encircled.

-

•

Hitler was enraged to think that the positions

could not be held.

He ordered Kuechel to Germany and' re~

placed him with General Halter Model.J
On January 30, the.American Charge d*Affaires presented.
President .Ryti with a note which asked that Finland take t h e ■
first steps toward making peace with R u s s i a . M a n n e r h e i m

-^Ziemke, 252,
56rbid,, 272-273,
•^United States Foreign Relations. 19^4t Ills 563.

was foi? the proposal, as he believed that Germany had lost
the war, and a Russian offensive against -Finland could not
be restrained for long.-^

with this advice in mind, Presi

dent Ryti sent Juho Paasikivi to Stockholm to receive SovietThe Russian demands.":

included the restoration of the Winter War Treaty, interniaen

c+

peace terms from Madame Kollontai.

of German troops in Finland, demobilization, and war repara-,,
tions. .When Paasikivi returned to Helsinki on February 23,
the demands were discussed by the leaders of state because,
they felt that Finland was not capable of- interning the
German forces.

A negative reply was returned,- but the Swedish

Foreign Minister persuaded the Finns to indicate that -they
hoped further negotiations could begin.

<9

Stalin had promised during the Tehran Conferences of
December, 1943, to offer Finland a peace that would preserve
its national independence, so Finland was invited to send
representatives to Moscow to begin negotiations.

On March

25, Paasikivi and former Foreign Minister Carl Enckell
left for the Kremlin,

6o

When they arrived, they were given

the basis of the- peace which Stalin had earlier outlined to
Churchill and Roosevelt.

It included: (1) internment or

expulsion of the German troops in Finland by the end of

d 8,
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April,

(2) restoration of the 19^0 borders,

prisoners,

(3) exchange of

(1) demobilization of the Finnish army, (5) pay

ment of a war reparation of six-hundred million American
dollars over a period of five years, and (6) the return of
Pechenga to the Soviet Union in exchange for the Russian
relinquishment of it's lease on Eanko,6l
. The negotiation team returned to Helsinki on April 1,
and reported the peace proposals to the Diet,

Finland was

still not capable of interning or expelling the German army,
especially by the end of April®

The war reparation demanded

by the Soviet Union was far more than the Finns felt they
were capable of paying.

Instead of serving as a basis of

peace, the demand- brought only memories o f 'the post-Winter
:War years,

On April 18, the Russian proposals were rejected,

and Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky warned the Finnish
Government that it would have to bear the responsibility for
• '
A?
whatever followed.
In April, General Heinrichs was Invited to the Fuehrer
•Headquarters at Berchtesgaden by General Keitel,,

At the

meeting, both General Keitel and General Jodi expressed
their dissatisfaction with the Finnish cooperation,

General

Jodi said that Finland would have to make a declaration that

01Herbert Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 195751 268-269.
fsO
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German military equipment mould not fall into the hands of
the Russians,

Mannerhelm did attempt to fulfill the German

demand in a letter, but Hitler refused it saying that it
mas too cautious.

The arms shipments to Finland were not

continued, but it was stated that Finnish requests would be
considered on an individual basis,

To- increase the pressure

on Finland, grain shipments were also halted.0-'’
The quiet that had been maintained on the Finnish fronts
was broken on June 9 .

On that day the Soviet army began a

massive assault on the western base of.the Karelian Isthmus,
The attack, supported by three-hundred artillery pieces for
every half mile of the front, pushed the Finnish defenders
back six miles in just a few hours,

The Finns were forced

to retreat north to their second line of defense,

Finland

had organized three separate lines of defense on the isthmus:
one at the base, a few miles north at the point where the
isthmus began to widen, and the third was emplaced just
north of Viipuri. Mannerheim realized that it would be
futile to try to hold between the first and second lines, so
he had his men move-back behind the new defensive position
and brought down replacements from the Viipuri sector.

He

also asked for and received an immediate continuation of the
Shipment of arms and grain.

64
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’ The Marshal was also forced to evacuate his troops
from Soviet Karelia on June 15»

When General Heinrichs

communicated this news to General Dieted, the commander of
the Twentieth Mountain Corps was not angered by the with
drawal; in fact, he had been worried that the Finns might
have tried, to hold- the position until an effective retreat
would have been impossible,

Now the Finns could shorten

their lines in a stronger defensive position northeast of
Lake Ladoga and protect the southern flank of the German
forces„
While the Finns were still, completing their retreat
from the Svir, the Russians broke through Finland's second
line of defense on the Karelian Isthmus,

Now it was a ques

tion of whether, the Finns could regroup their forces in time
to make a stand, behind Viipuri, where they had made such a
prolonged defense against the Russians in the Winter War,
There was, however, little cause for optimism: The Russians
were in complete command of most of the isthmus -and now outnumoerea the Finns by two to one,66
The military crisis on the Karelian Isthmus produced a
corresponding political crisis in Helsinki,

Finland needed

additional arms to check the Russian offensive, and it was
forced to draw closer to an alliance with Germany in order

6
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to get them.

On June 18, General Heinrichs requested that

six German divisions be sent to Finland to cover the Finnish
troops while they moved from the Svir to the Karelian Isthmus.
Germany did send the 122nd Infantry Division and air units
from the Fifth Air Force, but Mannerheim had to promise
Hitler that Finland was ready to establish closer ties with
Germany to get this aid.°7
Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop arrived in Finland on
June 22 to extract a promise from President Eyti that neither
he nor any member of his government would negotiate a separate
peace with the Soviet Union.

While Ribbentrop was still in

Helsinkis the Soviet. Union communicated to the Finnish Foreign
Ministry through Stockholm that Finland would have to capi
tulate before a peace could be made,

The Soviets indicated

that since they had made previous peace offers they no longer
trusted Finland to enter Into honest negotiations.

This left

.Finland with signing an unconditional surrender with Russia, ■
or signing the agreement with Germany and try to continue
the war uriti1 Russia offered better terms.

Neither choice

appealed to the Finns, but they once again turned to the
Germans rather than the Russians.

On June 26, Ribbentrop

°•'’Ziemke, 28.1-282. Mannerheim completely ignores this.
.He mentions only -that he requested a few planes from General
Erfurth of- the German High Command. He does mention that
this led to Ribbentrop8s subsequent visit to Helsinki, but
he does not explain his own part in- bringing the German
Foreign Minister to Finland.
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threatened that all aid would cease unless the agreement
mere signed.

President Ryti relented, and he issued a

letter stating that neither he, nor anyone appointed by
him, would sign a peace treaty not approved by Germany,

68

The value of Ribbentrop*s diplomatic coup was doubtful.
If'Finland did decide to sign a separate peace, Germany
could not possibly hope to make the agreement stand by
threatening to withhold arms because the Finns would no y
longer have any need for them.

The only positive result of '

the' treaty as far as Germany was concerned was that Finland
had not been branded as an ally of the Reich,

One week after

Ryti *s letter was delivered to Hitler , the United States
broke off diplomatic relations with Finland, but. it did not .
declare war, 69
y
The Finns had had only one object in mind when they
signed the agreement with Germany —
offensive.

arms' to stop the Soviet

Arms were delivered to Finland, but not in the

amount promised by Ribbentrop.

Mannerheim, however, believed

that the addition of the one German division plus the new
anti-tank weapons would stabilize the front until more
favorable peace conditions could be won from the Soviet
jr

..

bin on.
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Mannerheim, d-8l-d83.
^ United States Foreign Relations, 19^‘t, III, 606~60?.
70
•o
1 Mannerheim, *k>3•
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The situation on the German eastern front continued to
grow worse.

Army Group Center m s pushed back into Poland,

and by mid-July it looked as if Army Group North would have
to retreat behind the Dvina River.

Hitler ordered his troops

to hold at all cost; a retreat now would cause Hitler to
n

lose complete control of the eastern BalticJ

-j

The fact that the Allies had invaded France in June gave
some relief to the Finns,

Marshal Mannerheim noted that the

Russians were beginning to withdraw many of its troops from
the Karelian Isthmus in order to concentrate on driving the
Germans from the Baltic States,

Mannerheim attributed-the

change In tactics on the' Russian's desire to beat the Allies
no

to Berlin A ~

Either way the Soviet Union directed its attack, Finland
was ultimately going to be the loser.

If the attack on the

Karelian Isthmus continued, Finland could not hope to hold

out for long.

If the Russians continued to attack Army Group

North In the Baltic States, Finland would soon lose its only
supply line and become Isolated from German protection and
supplies except for the troops of the Twentieth Mountain
Army in the north.
The time had now come for Finland to make- a decision.
It had long been tired of the war and continued to fight only

^Ziemke, 286-287,
^Mannerheim, 484-485•

155
because it hoped to extract more favorable peace terms from
the Soviet Union.

Germany had treated Finland expediently,

and sines the German army now seemed to be losing its last
footholds in Eastern Europe, there was no need to continue
the war to honor the "brotherhood in arms" with the Nazis.
As a first step to ending Finland's participation in
the war. President Ryti resigned on July 28, and urged
Marshal Mannerheim to accept the Presidency.

Eyti's position

as head of state had been seriously compromised by the agree
ment Ribbentrop had forced him to sign.

He felt that the

Russians, who were already suspicious of the Finns’ intentions
to negotiate, would never begin talks with a' government
headed by a man who was committed to continue the war.

On

August 1, Ryti submitted his resignation, and on the 4th the
Diet unanimously passed a bill elevating Mannerheim to the
presidency without the formal consent of the College of
ry

Electors.1J
Ryti's resignation and Mannerheim5s election came as a
surprise to the Germans.

For them it was difficult to pre

dict the course that the new president would take.

Mannerheim

was rersona non grata, in Moscow, and he was also the symbol
of Finland’s military establishment.

The Marshal, however,

was a realist in -political affairs, and it had been he who
had suggested that Finland get out of the Winter War.

^^Manne rhe im, 491-^92.

In
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order to encourage Finland to remain in the war, General
Keitel and G eneral Schoerner, who had replaced Model as
commander of Army Group North, were sent to Helsinki to
7.1

■promise renewed support. - Army Group N o r t h was now in a v er y precarious position
as the Russians still threatened to surround it in the Baltic.

Mannerheim welcomed the news that the Germans would continue
to hold.

He was not glad because it would give him. a chance

to continue the war, but because Finland would have a. chance
.to conclude peace before it was completely isolated.
Mannerheim was very frank with General Keitel.

He told him

/

that R y t i •s r e s i g n a t i o n had nullified the Ryti-Ribbentrop
agreement, and Finland no longer honored the commitment to
a s k ’G e r m a n y 's pe r m i s s i o n before a separate peace was con-

i - -- '75
clu.aea,
Later in August, the 'Swedish Government promised
Mannerheim that Sweden would supply Finland with foodstuffs
for a period of six months.

Now that Finland was assured

that it no l o nger had to depend on Germany for these supplies,
it began to try to establish negotiations with Russia.

On

August 25>'through its embassy in S t o c k h o lm,.Finland asked
if Moscow would receive n e g o t i a t o r s ,
were

The nex t d a y the Finns

informed that 'Russia was ready to negotiate for peace

Oil

Mannerheim,

5-92; and Z i e m k e , 288

^ ^Manne rhe i m , ^93«

if Finland, would immediately cease all -contact with Germany
and see that the German troops withdrew from their country
by no later than -September 15.

The Soviet terms were

accepted by Finland's Diet on September 2, and on the same
day, diploma/tic relations were broken with Germany and the
German commander in Finland was informed that his troops
must evacuate at once,

Marshal Mannerheim drafted a letter

to Hitler explaining Finland's new intentions.
In this hour of hard decisions I am
compelled to inform you that I have arrived
at the conviction that the salvation of my
nation makes it my duty to find a means to
end the war»
I wish especially to emphasize that
Germany will live on even if fate should
not crown your arms with victory. Nobody
could give such an assurance regarding
Finland. If that nation of barely four
millions.be militarily defeated, there can
be little doubt-that it will be driven into
exile or exterminated, I“cannot expose my
people to such a fate.
I regard, it as my duty to lead my- people
out of the war. The arms which you have so
generously given us I will never of my own
accord turn against Germans. I cherish the
hope that, even though you may take excep
tion to my letter, you will share the wish
of all Finns, that the change in our gela
tions may not give rise to animosity,
Again the Germans were surprised: they had continued to
hope and believe that Finland would never accept the punitive
Soviet terms.

There was some discussion in Germany of trying

^Mannerheim, 493-495•
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to replace Mannerheim with a rpo-German government and
organizing resistance movements among the pro-Nazi segments
of the population.
than logic,

These suggestions bore more frustration

Mannerheim had complete control of his forces,

77
and the Finnish people supported the move toward peace,''

Mannerheim continued contact with the Soviet Union bynegotiating a cease fire with Stalin on September 4.

The

Finnish Peace Delegation arrived in Moscow on September 7,and the terms that were presented to them were similar to
the ones that Stalin had outlined earlier to Churchill.

The

war reparations had been cut in half, but the Soviet Union
now demanded the right'to use Finnish airfields, ports, and
.Merchant Marine for the duration of the war.

On September 19,

■the Diet gave its approval to' the terms, and the Continuation
bar had come to an end,

78

Finland had technically ended its participation in the
war, but it still had to cope with the article- of the peace
treaty which stipulated that German troops were to be removed
from the country in two weeks,

Finland had no desire to

face the 200,000 German troops in the north under hostile
conditions.

The Finns hoped that Germany would recognize

the futility of trying to maintain its present positions in
Finland and begin a peaceful retreat,

^ Z i e m k e , 289-290,
^Mannerheim, 497-501,

Germ&ny was not in a
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position to maintain its 'present line of b a t t l e , but it did
desire to hold and secure whatever positions it felt were
necessary to maintain its interests in Norway and the Baltic*
The German High C ommand had long ago m ade preparations
for a w i t h drawal from Finland.

In February of

Opera

tions Tarne and Birke were designed to remove German troops

from southern and northern Fin l a n d and protect positions that
the .Reich believed vital to Its war aims*

Operation Tanne

Nest would attempt to occupy the Aaland Islands, while Tanne
Ost was to take the island of Suursaari in the Gulf of F i n 
Operation Birke provided for the withdrawal of the

land.

Twentieth M o u n t a i n Army and the establishment of defensive
positions near

P e c h a n g a . ^

O peration Tanne West and Ost proved 'to be impossible to

begin in September.

Sweden had considerable interest In the

Aaland Islands, and OKH felt that the Swedes might cut off
Germany's supply of iron ore if they were t a k e n .

On Septem-'

ber 3,.H i t l e r cancelled Tanne West when he learned that the

division in D e n m a r k which was responsible for the 'operation
could not be s p a r e d .

Tanne Ost was similarly cancelled when

it was found that only untrained troops were available for
- 80
the assault; on Suursaari.

•70

_

,

'•'Warlimont, 41b? and Ziemke / 22o-22d •

®vl_bid., b72? and Ibid., 292»
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The Twentieth Mountain Army aid begin Operation Birke
on September 6.

The operational plans had not been divulged

to the Finns, and Germany hoped, to establish defensive posi
tions before either the Finnish or the Russian army could
offer pursuit.

The Finnish Government had told the German

army that it believed that Russia would respect the 19^1
borders,’ Germany, however, decided to conduct the retreat as
if It were being undertaken on enemy rather than friendly or
neutral territory. 8
The XXVT Mountain Corps, which had not yet had time to
withdraw from, its position between Sal la and. Kandalaksha, was
surprised by Russian armored units on September 7 .

The

Mountain Corps began Its retreat on the 9th, and the Russians
halted their pursuit at S&lla as the German forces drew back
west of the 19^0 Finnish border.

The rest of the retreat

from Finland went more smoothly on the west coast.

The eva

cuation from the Finnish ports on the Baltic Sea began on
September 6 and in one week all military personnel had been
removed from southern Finland.0^
The first open hostilities between Germany and Finland
came during the second week of the evacuation. 'The German,
High Command had begun to change its mind on Operation Tanne’
Ost when the Finnish commander on Suursaari said that he

LZiemke, 293.
62 -1,-vL,/jm,d3 s

9

oo.l— o o <

id. y

/

D*

161
would never fire on German troops.

Admiral Boenltz, who

had been in charge of the German navy since 19*J-3, placed
great importance on the island,

He felt that if the island

•could 'be occupied, Germany could-continue to block the Soviet
Baltic Fleet's entrance to its naval, base at Kronstadt.
Therefore, he proposed that Tanne Ost be set into motion by
September 15*

Troops were assembled at Reval and a landing

was attempted on the 15th,

Contrary to the light resistance

that had been expected, the Finns opened fire on the German
troops as they came out of their landing craft, and the
Russians contributed heavy air strikes,

The.Nazis were

forced to rescue as many men as possible and return across
the Gulf of Finland to Reval,
Finland did not regard the Suursaari episode as a pro
vocation to begin open warfare against the Germans.

In fact*

the German attack was fortunate in that it gave the Finns a
chance to prove that it was serious in its attempt to remove
the German forces from their homeland.

The German army

finally made an agreement with Finland, that would facilitate
their withdrawal into Norway,

The Finns would offer pursuit
#

in order to make Russia believe that they were pressing the
Germans, but they would allow the German forces to destroy :
bridges and roads in order to give themselves an excuse for
never actually catching up with the retreating army.

6-’Mannerheim ? *1-98-499» and Ziemke, 2 9 6 ,

The

162
Firms, however, warned the Germans that they were determined
to have peace, and they would have to continue to try, in
81part, to accept. all Soviet demands,■
On September 28, the Russians told Finland, that they
were ready 'to "assist" the Finns if they were having trouble
with the German troops.

The threat of Soviet intervention

produced more hostilities, as the Finns now ordered the
Germans to hurry their retreat.

On October 2, the German

forces were ordered, to operate "without restraint" against
the Finns,

Now, the Finns were fired upon, hostages were

taken, and a path of total destruction was laid behind the
path of retreat,

3y October 8, the German troops had turned

north at Rovanieni and. were beginning to head toward Norway
OKil, in early October, began to plan an extension of
Operation Birke.

It was now decided that the Finnish nickel

was no longer needed.

Now, instead of forming defensive

positions about the nickel fields of northeastern Finland,
the Twentieth Mountain Army was to withdraw to the so-called'-'
Lyngen Position, •A short line between the Lyngen Fjord in
Norway and the northern tip of Sweden,

Here, the Germans

hoped to continue to control the northern' Norwegian coast
against any Allied attack.

fUi,
‘Ziemke, 297
b ^Manne rhe iia, 5 0 -5 05
^Ziemke, 300,
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'By December, the Nazis controlled only a fen square
miles of Finnish territory along the northwest border.

This

position was held until the Germans5 surrender in April, 19^5 >
but, although this small foothold in Finland was retained,
Un

German influence in Finland had been comule tel;/ ended.w

^Ziemke, 301-3119 pas i

CONCLUSION
The' course of Nazi Germany’s diplomatic history with
Finland is a classic example of the Reich's political ex
pedience,.

The German people and even .many of...the Nazi

leaders had a large store of sympathy for Finland’s struggle
to remain outside the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, but
this concern for Finland’s plight was subordinated to the
Reich’s concern for its own welfare,
Finland has unforfunately been branded by some .as a
willing Nazi ally.

This is definitely not the case,

Finland,

because of its geographical location in the Baltic, was
caught at the apex, of a political triangle which also Included
the Soviet Union and Germany.

Russia had long been a menace

to the tenuous security of the Finnish people, first, when
Finland Russia moved west to- fight Sweden five-hundred years
ago, and then when the Soviet Union tried to use Finland as
a buffer zone against German aggression in two world wars,
A tiny country of only a -little over three and a half million,
people, Finland has never been able to gain a complete con- /
■; .

trol over its 'own destiny.

It has only been able to survive'

by allying itself with stronger nations and by bending to
the’realities of European politics.
Finland's decision to’side with Germany, in its war’
against the Soviet Union was not really a matter of choice.

*
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It was the only alternative left to the country once it ;hs.d
been deserted by Sweden and isolated from Great Britain and
France by Hitler's conquest of Norway in 19^0.

Neither the

Soviet Union nor Germany would have allowed Finland to remain
out of the war.

Russia had long indicated that its troops

would move Into Finland if a war with Germany began.

Hitler

had included Finland as a possible ally against Russia long
before he asked the Finns for their support.

Finland, then,

had only three courses of action before it: (1) remain neutral
and see Its lands turned into a Russo-German battlefield,
(2) ally itself with the Soviet Union and face a future pro
gram of Russification, or (3) ally itself w i t h Germany and
try to eliminate the Soviet menace once and for all.

Given

the facts that Finland was Isolated from the Western Allies,
i t .considered Russia as. its mortal enemy, and Germany seemed
to have an undisputed control over Europe, it Is not difficult
to understand why Finland chose to collaborate with the Nazis,
Had Finland not bordered on the Soviet Union, it may
have been able to escape the war by remaining neutral as
Sweden did.

Had it been located on the North Atlantic, it

would undoubtedly have tried to align itself with the Western
Allies,

The principles of democracy ran deep in Finland, and

there was little love for or desire to cooperate with the
Nazis even-aftey it was forced into the war' on. Germany's
side.
One cannot blame a nation for trying to save Its

independence. During the war years, many nations found them
selves compromising their principles in order to escape
totalitarian domination.

Great Britain did not relish its

alliance with the Soviet Union, nor did Hungary wish to join
the Nazi camp.

These were decisions which had to be made

in order to survive in an era of Realpolitlk.
Hitler used Finland for his own ends.
doubt of this.

There can be little

By placing Finland within the Soviet sphere

of influence in 1939? the Fuehrer was temporarily appeasing
Russia at Finland’s expense.

It was only in 19^0, when

Hitler’s attention was turned once again to the East, that
Germany considered friendly relations with Finland,
Germany was Interested in Finland primarily as a second
front against the Soviet Union.

It had been interested in

the Finnish nickel, -but this was a secondary matter compared
to the strategic geographic location of Finland.

The interest

In the nickel was Important only because Germany was exper
iencing wartime shortages; the Reich had no intention of
conquering the country to control that metal.

Hitler also

did not have any -plan to Include Finland as a part of the
German Lebensraum.

Indeed, he even believed that Finland’s

swamps and rugged Arctic winters made the country unsuitable
for the German way of life.

The Fuehrer talked vaguely of

expanding Finland’s borders to the east and the south, but
this stemmed from a desire to create a strong ally in the
north rather than from any great love of the Finnish people.

1.6 ?
Before 19^0, Hitler looked upon Finland as being expendable.
After 19^-0, he looked to Finland only as a means by which he
could expedite his campaign against the Soviet Union.

To the

Fuehrer, Finland was simply a piece of real estate to be
bartered or retained, depending on the current needs of the
Reich.
Finland also tried to use Germany as expediently as
possible, and it succeeded to a certain extent.

Finland's

war aims were limited and completely contingent upon the.
Nazis' ability' to win a decisive victory over the Soviet
union.

Finland wanted to cooperate with Germany only in so

far as that cooperation would be of assistance to itself, .
This was Illustrated on numerous occasions, much to the dis
may of the German army.

When Hitler's attack into Russia

began to stall, he began to look for additional assistance
from Finland,

When Leningrad refused to fall,- the Germans

requested that Finland extend its war aims and continue its
•offensive to the south.

The desired cooperation never mat

erialized, because Finland realized that Germany had over
extended itself and it could no longer achieve a decisive
victory over Russia.

When the Germans began their retreat

from Russia, Finland began an equally proportionate with
drawal of its support to the Reich.
The Nazi campaign to dominate Europe brought out the
best and the worst in many nations.

Hitler's strategy forced

many countries to revert to an almost primeval survival of
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the fitest diplomacy.

For the nations that shared a common

border with Russia, the struggle for national existence was
doubly complicated.

These nations found themselves caught

between two super powers which showed little concern for the
rights of other countries in their own quest'for expansion
and national security.

The diplomatic maneuvering and then

the military struggle between Finland, Germany, and the.
Soviet Union was just another chapter in the story of Hitler's
attempt to conauer Europe.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
primary Sources

Blumentritt, Guenther. Von Rnndstedt, The Soldier and the
Man, Translated by CuthBe"rt”Reavely. London; bdhams
Press, 1952.
Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer. The Second World Gar.
6 Vols. Boston; Houghton, Mifflin, Co., 1958-1953•

Degra-s, Jane. (ed.) Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1933"
1951. Vol. III. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953*
Finland. F inland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet
Policy, Harch 19~5q -J'une 1951 . New York: Wilfred Funk,
Inc., .1951.

Germany.

Kreigsmarine Oberkommando. Fuehrer Conferenses on
Matters- Dealing with the German Navy, 1939-19557' On
microfilm.

Gorlitz, Walter, (ed,) The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Wilhelm
Keitel. Translated by David Irving. New York: Stein
and Day, 1966.
Great Britain, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 191919,39 • Third Series, Vols. VI-IX. Edited by E. L.
Woodward and Rohan Butler, London: -H. M. Stationery
Office s 1957-1960.
Haider, Franz. The Private War Journal of Generaloberst
Franz Haider, 15""August 1939 to 3g5~September 1952. •
9 Vols, On deposit at the University of Montana,
Hambro, C. J. I Saw it Happen In Norway,
Appleton-C-entury, Co"., TT^HT"
~
Hedin, Sven. German Diary, 1935-1952,
Books, 19513----------- --------

New York: I),

Dublin: Euohorlon

International Military Tribunal,

Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal.
NuremburgT International Military Tribunal^ 1957.

Lochner, Louis P. (ed,) The Goebbels Diaries, 1952-1953.
New York: Doubleday, and Co., 1958.

l?0
Mannerheim, Carl Gustav. Memoirs. Translated by Count Eric
Lewenhaupt» New York: E. P. Dutton, and Co., 19 5&*
Office of the U. S. Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis
War Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression.
10 Vols. Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 19^6-1948.
Reynaud, Paul, In the Thick of the Fight, 1930-19^-5*
lated. by James D. Lambert, N e w York: Simon and
Schuster, 1955*

Trans

Sontag, Raymond James and Beddie,• James Stuart, (eds.) Nazi Sovtet Relations, 1939-19^1« New York: Didier, 19^8,
Spears, Sir Edward. Assignment to Catastrophe.
A. A. Wynn, Inc., 195^~»

Vol. I»

Tanner, v'Sino. The Winter War. Stanford, California: •
Stanford University Press, 1957•
Trevor-Roper, H. R. (ed.) Rlitzkreig; to Defeat: Hitler Vs War
Directives, 1939-19^5* New York: Holt, Rhinehart,
and Winston, 19od.
United States, Foreign Relations of the United States,
I9RI-I9AW, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1959-1965.
United States Department of the Army,
Office, ■Trials of War Criminals
Military Tribunal.s under Control
15 Vols. Washington, D.C~ : U.S.
Office, October 19^-6-April 194*9•

Adjutant General *s
Before the Nuremburg
of'Council Law No. 10.
Government printing

United States Department of State. Documents on German
•.
F oreign Policy, 1918 -194-5« Series D. Vols. I-VIII,
VJashington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1956-1966.

There are few primary sources which deal with Nazi
Germany’s relationship with Finland,

Most of the major

sources in English are written from a Finnish perspectivej
German sources treat the collaboration as a secondary matter.
Documents on German Foreign Policy has proved to be the most

171
valuable point of reference.

It clearly shovjs the expedient

diplomacy which Germany used to try to appease -Russia and
then cautiously bring Finland into cooperation with the
Reich.

Unfortunately, the series does not continue past

the invasion of Russia, and it does not go into the details
of the military plans between Germany and Finland.

Marshal

Mannerheim's Memoirs offers a good chronological sequence to
the relationship between Germany and Finland, but the book
cannot be entirely trusted to give accurate details.

Marine r-

helm has tried to obscure the events of the pre-Continuation
War military planning, and other sources must,be checked in
order to verify his statements.

The Winter War by Vaino

Tanner is an excellent study of the events that preceded the
Russo-.Finnish War of 1939-19^-0.

It portrays the desperate

situation that Finland found itself in once Germany had
agreed to give the Baltic States to Russia.
plays a secondary role in the work.

However, Germany

The very limited testi

mony of Nazi officers in Trials of the Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal does give addi
tional information on. the Finno-German military conferences
of 19^0-19^-1.

Na.z1 -S ovi e t Re la tions contains the best por

trayal of the position that Finland played in the relationship
between Germany and the USSR.

The Fuehrer Conferences and

the Balder Diaries both add random, but important, informa
tion on Hitler's attitude toward Finland.

The other works
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There are no secondary sources in English which deal
exclusively with Finno-German relations.

Earl Ziemke*s

The German Northern Theater of Operations is the most com
plete treatment of German military activities in Finland.
It is a well-researched volume, and the author has used ■
many Finnish and German sources which have not been translated into English.

It is a thorough and highly-objective

study of military matters, but it contains only a passing
reference to the diplomatic activities.

Finland In Crisis

and Finland in the Second World War are both well-documented
studies of the Finnish diplomacy of the period.

Upton's book

contains many interesting interpretations of questions con
cerning Finno-German relations which can not be authenticated
by documentation.

Charles fundin's work has a very valuable

chapter which evaluates the primary and secondary sources on
the subject of Nazi-Finnish collaboration.

Finland's 'eco

nomic dilemma In the early war years is well portrayed in"
Medlieott's Economic Blockade.

The remainder of the sources•

are all helpful, but they treat Finno-German relations as
a secondary issue.

